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Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967
Individual Learning Accounts
I am laying before Parliament under section 10(4) of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 this report, which contains
the results of my office's investigations into two individual complaints that the Department for Education and Skills (DfES)
failed to establish and operate adequate controls and safeguards in respect of the Individual Learning Account scheme (the
scheme), leaving the scheme open to misuse and possible fraudulent activity.  
One of the complaints, referred by Mr Christopher Chope MP, was from a student who complained that he was unable to
register his training course to obtain a discount under the scheme before its closure on 23 November 2001, because his
account had been fully used without his knowledge or consent.  As a result he was left responsible for the full costs of his
chosen course.  The individual concerned is not identified by name in this report.  The other complaint, referred by Mr Boris
Johnson MP, was from Mr Tuckett, a learning provider, who complained that DfES had, through the scheme, encouraged a
substantial growth in the market for basic training in information technology (IT), but had unreasonably refused to accept any
responsibility for the consequences on that market of the sudden withdrawal of the scheme.  In particular, DfES had refused
to offer any compensation to learning providers who faced hardship as a result of the withdrawal of the scheme.  Mr Tuckett
has given his permission for his name to be used in this report.  My office has reported separately, under section 10(1) of the
Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, to the Members who put the individual complaints to me.  What follows in this report
is a merged and edited version of those two reports. I received two other complaints from students and ten others from
learning providers who made similar complaints to those investigated.  The individual cases investigated were chosen as
representative of all those complaints. 
For reasons explained in the report, I have found that DfES were guilty of serious maladministration.  I have also found that
DfES's service provider, Capita Business Services Ltd, failed to work effectively with DfES to make sure that there were
adequate safeguards built into the scheme and the supporting computer system to prevent improper access to individual
learning accounts once the original requirement for prior accreditation of learning providers was abandoned.  Those failings
contributed to the need first to suspend and then to close the scheme prematurely.  Ironically, however, the very success of
the scheme in attracting new learners also led to a significant cost overrun which Ministers judged to be unsustainable and
made it necessary anyway to close the scheme.  I have further found that there was some delay in processing applications
for account numbers following receipt, and that a number of applications for account numbers, which had been properly
submitted in good time, were not actioned following the suspension of the scheme.  
As to redress for the injustice caused by the maladministration I have identified, I have concluded that it was not
unreasonable for DfES to rule out a national compensation scheme to cover the full business losses suffered by learning
providers who made their business plans on the assumption that the scheme would continue indefinitely.  I have, however,
concluded that students whose accounts were misappropriated, and who as a result incurred course costs that would
otherwise have been eligible for a discount under the scheme, should have those costs reimbursed by DfES.  I have also
concluded that learning providers who can demonstrate that some or all of their eligible students properly applied for account
numbers before the suspension of the scheme was announced on 24 October 2001, but whose registration, because of
administrative failings, had not been logged on to the scheme by 6.30 pm on 23 November 2001 when it was closed down,
should be compensated for the loss of the due discount.
Ann Abraham
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration
(the Ombudsman)
April 2003
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Individual
Learning Accounts
The complaints investigated
Case No. C.1413/02
1. Mr A complained that he was unable to register
his training course to obtain a discount under the
Department for Education and Skills' (DfES) Individual
Learning Account scheme (the scheme) before the closure
of the scheme on 23 November 2001, because his
Individual Learning Account (account) had not been
adequately safeguarded by DfES and had been fully used
without his knowledge, leaving him responsible for the full
cost of the course.
Case No. C.1401/02
2. Mr Tuckett complained that DfES failed to
establish and operate adequate controls and safeguards in
respect of the scheme, leaving it open to fraudulent
activity.  He complained that DfES failed to respond
adequately to queries about the rules of the scheme
during its operation and failed to give guidance to learning
providers about the arrangements for and implications of
closure of the scheme when that was announced on 
24 October 2001.  He complained that DfES gave no
contractual notice to learners or learning providers when
the scheme was prematurely curtailed on 23 November
2001.  He also complained that the scheme was poorly
administered by DfES's contracting agency, resulting in
unacceptable delay in the issue of registrations to some
students and a backlog of outstanding payments at the
time the scheme was suspended; and that the contracting
agency subsequently delayed making those payments.  He
further complained that although DfES had, through the
scheme, encouraged a growth in the market for basic IT
training, they unreasonably refused to accept any
responsibility for the consequences on that market of the
withdrawal of the scheme.  In particular, they refused to
offer any compensation to learning providers such as 
Mr Tuckett's company (the company), who faced hardship
as a result of the withdrawal of the scheme. 
3. The investigations began in March 2002 once the
Ombudsman had received the comments of the Permanent
Secretary of DfES after the referral of the complaints by
the referring Members.  I have not put into this report
every detail investigated by my staff, but I am satisfied
that no matter of significance has been overlooked.  
4. Following the general election in June 2001 and
the subsequent reorganisation of Government
departments, the Department for Education and
Employment was reorganised and the scheme became the
responsibility of DfES.  For ease of reference I will refer to
DfES throughout this report.
Jurisdiction
5. The Ombudsman's remit, which is laid down by
the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 (the Act), is to
consider whether administrative fault by the bodies that
fall within her jurisdiction has resulted in an unremedied
injustice to the aggrieved person, and if so, to invite
appropriate redress. Under section 5(2)(b) of the Act the
Ombudsman is generally debarred from investigating
matters where there is a remedy in law. Under section
12(3) of the Act, the Ombudsman may not question
discretionary decisions taken without maladministration.
She has no powers to question the merits of Government
policy, and where a policy has been embodied in
legislation the matter is even further beyond her
investigative reach since the content of legislation is a
matter for Parliament. 
Policy background to the scheme
6. In May 1997 the Labour Party published its
election manifesto, which included a commitment to
promote lifelong learning for adults.  The manifesto said
that, if elected, a Labour Government would invest public
money for training in individual learning accounts which
individuals could then use to gain the skills they wanted,
and would give one million people each a contribution of
£150 towards funding their training, to which they would
be expected to add small investments of their own.  The
target was for there to be one million accounts by March
2002.  In 1998, the Government published a green paper
on lifelong learning, "The Learning Age", which set out in
more detail DfES's plans for the scheme. 
7. In his budget speech of 9 March 1999, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer outlined the financial
incentives that would be available under the scheme1. He
said that the Government would introduce individual
learning accounts and open up tax-free learning in basic
and advanced computing.  The first million adults to use an
account would each receive £150 to be put towards the
course of their choice. Once that offer was exhausted the
scheme would provide discounts on learning costs.  Any
adult with an individual learning account would also be
able to claim a discount of 20 per cent (an additional grant
of up to £100) on the cost of vocational learning.  For all
adults signing up to improve their basic education,
including computer literacy, there would be a discount of
80 per cent on course fees.   DfES subsequently set aside
a budget of £199 million over the two years 2000-01 and
2001-02 for the scheme.
1 Hansard, 9 March 1999, Col 180
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Legislative and administrative
background
8. Sections 104, 105 and 108 of the Learning and
Skills Act 2000 gave the Secretary of State the power to
make regulations appertaining to the provision of
qualifying accounts and grants for certain types of
education or training.  The Individual Learning Accounts
(England) Regulations 2000 (the Regulations) laid down
the conditions under which persons were eligible to open
individual learning accounts.  Under Regulations 5 and 6,
grants were payable to account holders in respect of
education or training of a kind specified by the Secretary
of State, provided by a person who had registered with
the individual learning account administrator and whose
registration had not been withdrawn.  Under Regulation 7,
the amount of any grant payable was to be determined by
the Secretary of State.  Under Regulation 8, the Secretary
of State could determine the terms on which the grants
were to be paid.  Regulation 8(4) provided that a learning
account administrator could pay grants under
arrangements made by the Secretary of State.  The Act
and Regulations came into force on 1 September 2000.  
9. The Individual Learning Accounts Centre (the
service centre) carried out administration of the scheme,
operated on behalf of DfES by a private sector partner,
Capita Business Services Ltd (Capita).  To qualify for
subsidised learning under the scheme, individual learners
had to apply to the service centre to open an account by
completing an application form which could be obtained by
contacting the service centre by telephone, letter, e-mail
or by means of the scheme's website.  Until 28 September
2001 the service centre also supplied stocks of blank
application forms to learning providers for issue to
prospective applicants.  Learners were subject to eligibility
conditions in respect of age and residence in England, and
had to register for a course of eligible learning with a
learning provider registered under the scheme. That
entitled the learner to the incentives available under the
scheme, which took the form of a subsidy in respect of the
course costs, to be claimed by and paid directly to the
learning provider. 
10. To be able to offer, and receive payment of the
subsidy for, eligible learning under the scheme, learning
providers were required to register with the service
centre.  To register, learning providers had to complete a
simple form to confirm that they would comply with
various terms and conditions, and also with a number of
operational requirements.  Upon enrolling a student who
identified that he or she was an account holder and who
wished to use the incentives available under the scheme
to pay for part of his or her learning, the learning provider
was required to access the service centre's computer
database by means of the Internet, (there was also a
paper-based alternative for the small number of learning
providers who did not have IT facilities) and to record that
the student had commenced an eligible course.  For that
purpose, the service centre issued registered learning
providers with a user identity and initial password.
Claiming incentives was a two-stage process.  In the first
stage, the learning provider was required to "book"
learning by entering the details of the course that was to
be undertaken and the account holder's membership
number.  The system would check that the student existed,
was an active member of the scheme, and that the
incentive payment for which the student was eligible had
not already been used up. The learning provider then
entered the amount of the incentive being claimed; the
system would confirm the maximum amount of incentive
available; and the learning provider asked the system to
register that episode of learning.  The system would then
display the account holder's details for a final check.  In
the second stage, the learning provider was required to
access the system again to "confirm" that an episode of
learning had actually started and enter the date on which
it began (courses could not be confirmed until seven days
after the start date).  Once the learning had been
confirmed, the system would automatically generate a
periodic claim by each learning provider to DfES.
Incentive payments approved by DfES were paid directly
into the learning provider's bank account.   DfES were
responsible for final authorisation of all incentive
payments.
11. DfES's published rules of the scheme said that
scheme incentives could not be claimed retrospectively
where a person had already paid for his or her learning,
and specified that "arrangements [to claim incentive
payments] must be made at the time a person enrols and
pays for their course".  There was no stipulation in the
published rules in respect of the date from which an
individual's membership of the scheme became effective.
Administrative requirements in respect
of fraud and data security
12. "Government Accounting", a guide on accounting
and financial procedures for Government departments
published by HM Treasury, says that departments should
actively manage risks, including the risk of fraud, and
should take steps to prevent and detect fraud.  At the time
the scheme was being devised further guidance was
contained in a booklet "Managing the Risk of Fraud - a
Guide for Managers", published by HM Treasury in
November 1997.  The booklet said that departments
should identify by means of risk assessment the areas
vulnerable to fraud.  Where the risk of fraud was
identified, departments should evaluate existing controls
and if necessary implement additional controls.  On the
subject of data security, the guidance said that access to
computer systems was an important area which should be
very tightly controlled and that departments should
safeguard against the theft or misuse of sensitive
information.  The guidance also identified grant funding as
an area particularly vulnerable to fraud.  From November
2000 much of the guidance in the booklet was
incorporated directly into a revised edition of Government
Accounting.  The section on fraud management in
Government Accounting says that although the guidance is
generally advisory rather than mandatory, departments
should follow it unless there is good reason not to.
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13. Access to personal data held on computer
systems is governed by the Data Protection Act 1998.
Schedule 1 to that Act sets down the principles of data
protection to which data controllers are required to
adhere.  The seventh principle, which is set out in
Schedule 1 Part 1 paragraph (7), requires that appropriate
technical and organisational measures shall be taken
against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal
data.  Schedule 1 Part 1 paragraph (12)(b) says that
where processing of personal data is carried out by a data
processor on behalf of a data controller, the data
controller is not to be regarded as complying with the
seventh principle unless the contract requires the data
processor to comply with obligations equivalent to those
imposed on a data controller by the seventh principle.  The
Data Protection Act 1998 defines a data controller as "a
person who (either alone or jointly or in common with
other persons) determines the purposes for which and the
manner in which any personal data are, or are to be,
processed".  A data processor is defined as "any person
… who processes the data on behalf of the data
controller".
14. In April 2000 the Office of the e-Envoy published
a framework policy expressing the security requirements
of "information age" Government services2.  The scope of
that document includes functional security requirements
appropriate for the delivery of services by and on behalf of
Government to citizens and businesses.  The requirements
were also applicable to the delivery of Government
services by third party providers. Paragraph 32 of the
framework states that in considering the protective
measures to be put in place within "information age"
Government systems, a risk analysis must be performed.
That risk analysis must consider the intent, motivation and
capability of sources of threat; the feasibility of methods
of attack; the nature of vulnerabilities that may be
exploited; the value of assets to be protected; the
consequences of a successful attack; and the cost of any
counter-measures.  Paragraph 43 requires that access
granted should be the minimum required for the identified
user to obtain the service required, and that the user
should only be able to access those parts of the system
and data necessary to perform the authorised task.
Paragraph 45 requires that legitimate users, once granted
system access, cannot influence system data that the
required service does not need.
Investigation
15. 1999 In May, DfES published a booklet entitled
"Individual Learning Accounts - a Summary of Progress", in
which they outlined their plans for the operation of the
scheme.  DfES said that they intended to operate key
elements of the administration of the scheme through a
central customer services resource operated through a
public/private sector partnership. They said they would
look to learning providers (amongst others) as "potential
partners in individual learning accounts", to consider how
the scheme would affect the market in which they
operated, and attract new customers. On 25 August DfES
placed an advertisement in the Official Journal of the
European Community which said that DfES intended to
procure a service to implement the scheme and invited
applications to operate the service.  The closing date for
applications was 1 October.  DfES then envisaged that the
contract would be awarded by April 2000, that services
would be required from June and that the service would
be fully operational by September.
16. In late September 1999 Ministers agreed the
outline for the scheme's national framework and an
associated briefing pack to potential bidders for the
contract to run the supporting infrastructure for the
scheme. The briefing pack was to include a pre-
qualification questionnaire, for return by 1 November, to
enable DfES to assess the ability of each organisation
submitting a bid to operate the required service.  In light
of research and of discussion with financial institutions,
Ministers decided that the scheme would not be based on
a savings account model, where individuals could bank and
save their own money in addition to contributions from
others such as Government, employers and trade unions,
as had initially been envisaged.  However, Ministers
agreed that, in order to attract adults back into learning,
the scheme needed to be simple and flexible and should
provide learners with personal control and responsibility.
17. On 1 October consultants appointed to assist
DfES with the development and launch of the scheme's
national framework produced their market feasibility
report.  That report contained a section on operational
risks and detailed a number of risks associated with the
launch of the scheme within the required timescale.  The
report recorded that a project risk register had been
established and was held by the scheme's project team.
[Note: the earliest edition of the risk register on DfES's
files is dated February 2000; I have not seen the version
of the register referred to in the consultants' report.]
18. In October, DfES issued the briefing pack
(paragraph 16) to prospective bidders.  The briefing pack
outlined the policy objectives of the scheme and set out in
some detail DfES's requirements for the operation of the
customer service centre, in terms of the expected inputs,
the data to be maintained, the expected transactions and
the required outputs.  The briefing pack also said that the
customer service centre would be required to satisfy four
information requirements: the availability of data; the
currency of data; response times for data access; and
accuracy of data.  [Note:  there was no specification in the
briefing pack in respect of the security of data or data
protection.]
19. On 26 November officials informed Ministers of
the bidders to be shortlisted and offered an analysis of
their strengths and weaknesses.  On 6 December DfES
issued to the shortlisted bidders an invitation to negotiate,
which included a draft contract and a statement of
requirements.  The draft contract drew prospective
2 "Modernising Government: Framework for Information Age Government Security", version 1.0
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contractors' attention to the Data Protection Act 1998 and
required that they undertook to comply with all provisions
of that Act.  A schedule to the statement of requirements
listed a number of pertinent issues. The schedule included
a requirement that the contractor should explain how the
customer service centre might prevent, detect and deal
with external fraudulent incentive claims, which was said
to be a priority issue for DfES.
20. On 15 December Ministers approved the final
model for the scheme. 
21. The procedures and considerations involved in
the eventual approval of Capita as the preferred customer
service provider (paragraph 9) are commercial-in-
confidence.  However, I have seen relevant papers
including Capita's response to the invitation to negotiate.
That response contained a section on known risks and
assumptions, which confirmed that Capita had considered
the risks inherent in the scheme, in particular the potential
disruption to the project fulfilling its objectives.  The
response showed that Capita had also considered the risk
of fraud.  Capita said that their processes and information
systems would be designed to help prevent fraud, and that
they would implement a reporting and monitoring
procedure to enable DfES to be made aware of fraud.  The
probability of fraud occurring was expected to be low. 
22. 2000 On 18 February a meeting of the scheme's
contract management group recorded that, although the
project's risk register was in place and circulated regularly,
there were concerns about the risk management strategy.
[Note: those concerns were not specified in the note of the
meeting.] Officials undertook to facilitate a workshop on
risk assessment.  On 8 March officials submitted a paper on
risk management to the programme board.  [Note: the
programme board included DfES senior policy staff and
representatives from DfES's internal audit team but did not
include a representative of Capita.] The paper said that a
workshop had been arranged to review and agree the risks
to the project, and develop a strategy for managing the key
risks.   Enclosed with that paper was the project's risk
register dated 8 February 2000.  At that stage the register
recorded 16 risks, most of which concerned the possible
failure to deliver policy objectives and meet Ministerial
targets.  None of the recorded risks related to the
possibility of fraud or abuse of the scheme.  On 13 March
the risk management workshop took place.  The record of
that meeting shows that by then 24 risks had been
identified, and that consideration had been given to
operational risks.  Among the new risks identified were that
customers might not be satisfied with the quality of training
received; the risk of opening up to all learning providers too
soon [the record does not specify what risks that might
entail]; and the lack of control over demand.  There is no
indication in the record that the meeting considered the
possibility of fraud or abuse of the scheme. 
23. Also on 13 March officials updated Ministers on
progress on procurement.  They recommended to
Ministers that Capita should be advised that they were the
preferred bidder.  Their analysis of the bid and the key
issues made no reference to the possible risk of fraud or
the security of data. On 17 April officials recommended
that DfES should issue Capita with a letter of intent that
day, to enable them to start work on the customer service
centre's infrastructure.  They noted that DfES had little
room for manoeuvre in terms of timescales if the scheme
was to be operational by September and said that it had
not yet been possible to negotiate all the details of the full
contract. 
24. On 27 April an official wrote an internal e-mail
commenting on a "strategy group paper on learning
providers". [Note: I have not had sight of that paper, as
DfES have been unable to locate it.] She noted among
other points that the statement of requirements for the
scheme had initially restricted registration of learning
providers to those registered with the Further Education
Funding Council and approved by Training and Enterprise
Councils.  Subsequently, the intention had been to include
learning providers covered by quality assurance
arrangements in place through the Learning and Skills
Council.  However, the strategy group paper implied that
the intention had changed so that account holders could
undertake training with any learning provider.  The official
also noted that the customer service provider had not
been asked to undertake any checks in respect of the
quality of learning provision or health and safety.  [Note: I
found no response to that commentary on DfES's files.]
25. At a meeting between DfES officials and Capita
representatives on 4 May it was accepted that it would not
be practicable to establish a link between the
learndirect3 database of registered learning providers
and the scheme's computer system because of technical
difficulties of data incompatibility.
26. On 2 June DfES and Capita signed a preliminary
contract, which they referred to as the Individual Learning
Account Service Provider Agreement.  On 12 June the
service centre became operational and started to accept
registrations of learning providers.  In June, the service
centre wrote to a selection of public and private sector
learning providers inviting them to register for the
scheme.  The service centre enclosed a registration pack
which included a registration form, a definition of the
types of learning eligible for incentives under the scheme
and a set of terms and conditions.  Prospective learning
providers were required to confirm that they held a United
Kingdom bank account, that they complied with current
health and safety requirements and that they held valid
public liability insurance.  The terms and conditions also
stated that registration with the service centre did not
3 learndirect is the brand name of DfES’s University for Industry (UfI).  UfI has two separate responsibilities.  One is an information
and advice service based on a national database of learning opportunities.  The database is a list, not an endorsement, of current provi-
sion and UfI does not quality assure learning providers whose courses are included in the database.  It was that database that DfES and
Capita had hoped to link to the scheme’s computer system.  UfI’s other function is to set up a network of geographically based learning
centres.  learndirect provision funded by the Learning and Skills Council is subject to inspection by the Audit Learning Inspectorate.
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guarantee the quality of learning provision and that
registration was an administrative process only; and that
learning providers should not promote their learning
provision as being approved or accredited by the service
centre. [Note: the precise date of the service centre's
letters is not clear from the copies on DfES's files.]
27. On 19 June the project risk register was revised.
Among the risks added to the register was the possibility
of "creative pricing" by learning providers, in recognition
that some providers in the private sector might seek to
inflate course prices before the launch of the scheme.  As
a counter-measure DfES proposed to monitor complaints
from learners.  If necessary, as contingency measures,
market mechanisms could be utilised to level prices and
the discount and incentive mechanisms could be revised.
The register also recorded that there was a risk of
deliberate fraud by learning providers, who might use
fraudulent practices to access scheme funds, for example
by submitting "ghost" learners. [Note: there was no
reference to the possibility of computer fraud.] DfES
proposed various counter-measures including the
development of fraud monitoring procedures; liaison with
awarding bodies, professional institutions, and suitably
placed local bodies; and the institution of an audit regime.
The proposed contingency measures were to revise the
system of authorisation of learning providers, and to
revise procedures.  The register records that the risk of
deliberate fraud carried a low probability and would have
a low impact on the operation of the scheme.  On 2 August
the Minister agreed that a cap of £200 should be
introduced from 1 October on the 80 per cent discount
available for certain maths and computer literacy courses
(paragraph 7) with a view to reducing the cost to the
public purse. [Note: the effective date of the imposition of
the cap was subsequently put back to 23 October.]
28. On 4 September the scheme became fully
operational. 
29. On 9 October officials referred to the
programme board a report of a review of the risks to the
programme.  The review recorded that "The trend on this
risk has worsened" in respect of the risk of creative
pricing from learning providers, and that the probability of
the risk of fraud by learning providers had increased from
low to medium.  Capita had drawn attention to one
company that had supplied "dubious trainee data", while
the activities of eight other learning providers gave cause
for concern.  The report said that there was to be a
general audit of those providers in November.
30. Also on 9 October the High Court ruled on an
application by a learning provider for judicial review of a
decision by DfES to de-register the provider from the
scheme and so prevent the provider from offering the 80
per cent discount (paragraph 7) on a particular course
that the provider was promoting.  In rejecting the
application, the Court said that it was "manifestly
incumbent on a public authority to obtain best value for
their money, whatever the budget involved".  If experience
showed that there were defects in the scheme which
impeded its objectives from being fully realised, DfES were
entitled to learn from that experience.  They were not
obliged to operate the scheme unaltered in perpetuity or
until allocated funds ran out.
31. On 7 November DfES and Capita formally signed
the contract for provision of the scheme and the service
centre.  That contract, which I have seen, replaced the
agreement between Capita and DfES made on 2 June
(paragraph 26).  The contract drew Capita's attention to
the Data Protection Act 1998.  It required that Capita must
undertake to comply in all respects with the provisions of
that Act in relation to all personal data collected or
processed in the provision of services under the contract.
The contract contained a schedule of the specific services
to be provided by Capita.  In respect of the criteria for
registration of learning providers, the schedule stipulated
that learning providers must be "currently registered with
either the Further Education Funding Council, Training and
Enterprise Councils, Local Enterprise Companies or with
an awarding body e.g. City and Guilds or BTEC.  The
contractor (Capita) will need to verify this current
registration with the appropriate authority".  A further
prerequisite was that learning providers "must be
registered on learndirect's learning opportunities
database" (paragraph 25).  Those provisions were said to
have commenced from 12 June 2000.  No variations to
that requirement were recorded in the contract.  The
contract also stipulated that Capita would provide a
system that would authorise and earmark individual
incentive payments on request from learning providers,
who were required, by means of an Internet interface with
the scheme's computer system, to declare and certify the
appropriate incentives for courses.
32. The contract prescribed that the service centre
would process applications to open accounts, subject to
the applicant fulfilling minimum eligibility criteria, and
issue successful applicants with a membership card giving
their account number.  That service was to be measured
in terms of speed of fulfilment; the contract specified that,
for monthly monitoring purposes, performance would be
measured against a target of 95 per cent of enquiries and
requests to be dealt with within two days. [Note: DfES
have told my staff that the target as publicised to learning
providers was ten days; that accords with Mr Tuckett's
understanding (paragraph 84)].  As regards data security,
the contract prescribed that each account would have a
unique identifier which must comply with the provisions of
the Data Protection Act 1998.  In respect of telephone
calls from account holders, the service centre was
required to verify the identity of the caller before releasing
any information, by confirming the contents of a minimum
of two fields from a specified list of fields held on the
computer system. There were no equivalent requirements
in respect of learning providers.  In respect of Internet
access there were to be specific strategies for different
communication channels, including personal identification
numbers and passwords.   The contract contained no
specific requirement to establish security policies or
procedures.  As regards fraud, the only reference in the
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contract was in respect of the procedure for authorisation
of payment of incentives to learning providers, which
stipulated that "the fraud issue will be addressed by
agreeing specific [management information] reports
generated through data mining techniques".  
33. On 9 November the programme board
considered a paper entitled "Individual Learning Accounts
- Audit Requirements".  That paper said that an audit
investigation of one learning provider was about to begin.
The paper recorded that officials intended to make further
visits to Capita to confirm that their processes were
robust and that incentive claims could be substantiated.
[Note:  DfES officials undertook a preliminary systems
audit in April 2001.  That audit was not documented, but
Capita described the informal feedback from it as "very
positive".] Capita had agreed to carry out checks to try to
identify any potential irregularities in the claims submitted
by learning providers.  If irregularities were identified,
DfES intended to take action to assess whether incentives
had been claimed correctly, and would pursue
investigative action against individual learning providers
where necessary. [Note: my staff have seen no evidence
as to whether those checks were carried out.]
34. 2001 On 5 January Capita's monthly report of
the service centre's performance for December 2000
recorded that the target turnaround time for processing
membership applications was that 95 per cent of
applications should be processed within two days and that
actual performance had been 98.19 per cent  (the
performance for September 2000 had been 80 per cent,
October 78 per cent and November 90 per cent).  The
same report noted that of 209,335 application packs
issued in December, 180,299 had been issued as a result
of requests from learning providers.  
35. On 23 January the programme board at their
monthly meeting decided that in future they would review
the full risk register on a quarterly basis, but would
continue to review high risk areas monthly.  The review of
the risk register produced for that board meeting recorded
that DfES were conducting a formal investigation of one
learning provider in respect of possible deliberate fraud
and had begun an investigation of another who appeared
to be contravening the rules of the scheme.  DfES also
intended to conduct an audit of eight learning providers
whose pricing gave cause for concern and a sample audit
of other learning providers.
36. On 2 May the target of one million account
holders (paragraph 6) was reached, almost a year early.
Meanwhile, at the end of April, Ministers had agreed that
a more coherent system of learning provider registration
should be established by September 2001, with a view to
improving compliance by learning providers with the
scheme's policy objectives.   They agreed to introduce a
code of practice, or "learning provider agreement". The
code was intended to give a clear explanation of the aims
of the policy and ensure that learning providers
understood the terms and conditions of their registration.
However, there was no plan for DfES to undertake a
system of vetting learning providers.  On 10 May DfES
wrote to all learning providers introducing the learning
provider agreement.  All learning providers were required
to re-register under the scheme and sign up to the
learning provider agreement by 30 June. The letter
warned learning providers that if they failed to do so, their
registration would cease from 14 July. 
37. Meanwhile, on 9 May the programme board had
agreed to include in the risk register the quality of training
as a specific risk.  The paper on the review of risks
submitted to the programme board recorded that the
trend in respect of deliberate fraud by learning providers
had worsened.  The paper said that DfES's Special
Investigations Unit was co-operating with the police over
two cases, and another large learning provider had been
asked to provide comments on DfES's concerns over the
way that they were operating the scheme.
38. On 12 May Mr A submitted his application to
open an account.  On 24 May the service centre processed
his application form and backdated his membership of the
scheme to 16 May.
39. Following the general election on 7 June and
subsequent Government re-organisation, Ministerial
responsibility for the scheme passed to the then
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Adult Skills. On
29 June officials alerted Ministers to their concerns over
the behaviour of a small number of learning providers.
They said that registration of learning providers operated
on the basis of a "light touch" and was designed to place
minimal burdens on providers while offering adequate
protection for public funds.  However, following
investigation of instances where learning providers did not
appear to be following the rules of the scheme, nine
learning providers had been suspended, one had been
warned and a further 40 were under investigation.  On 
12 July the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State wrote
to all learning providers to say that DfES had identified a
number of unacceptable practices by learning providers,
and that DfES would take firm action in respect of
complaints that they received. He concluded by thanking
learning providers for their involvement in the scheme and
for their help in DfES's work to improve the skills level and
productivity of the workforce. On 31 July the introductory
offer of £150 incentive for the first one million account
holders (paragraph 7) came to an end.
40. Meanwhile, early in July 2001 the company,
which Mr Tuckett intended to be a community-based
learning provider to provide Internet access and basic
computer training, had commenced trading.  On 25 July
the company wrote to the service centre enclosing a list of
57 learners who, they said, had submitted applications for
individual learning account membership ten days or more
previously, but who had yet to receive account numbers.
Most of them had already started courses.
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41. On 1 August DfES produced revised guidance on
the learning eligible for scheme discounts.  That guidance
included a note that people could benefit from a discount
only if their accounts were dated on or before the course
start date. On 15 August DfES's Workplace Learning
Division wrote to learning providers to outline a number of
practices which DfES had identified as unacceptable.
Those were: learning starting before an individual became
an account holder; failure to obtain completion of an
enrolment form; failure to collect a personal contribution
from individual students; and the use of aggressive or
misleading marketing material.  DfES said that where
there was evidence that a learning provider had adopted
one or more of those practices DfES would investigate,
would seek repayment of any money paid improperly, and
would consider removal of the learning provider from the
scheme's register.  
42. On 20 August the programme board again
reviewed the risks to the scheme.  They noted that a much
higher than expected demand in the final week of the £150
offer for the first million applicants (paragraph 7) had
caused Capita's service to suffer.  They also noted that
there was evidence of agencies recruiting scheme
members and selling their personal details to learning
providers.  They proposed to recommend to Ministers that
blank application forms be withdrawn. The review of risks
referred to the programme board's meeting recorded that
officials were increasingly concerned about improper
marketing, creative pricing and deliberate fraud, and
recorded a new risk (classified as medium probability) that
learning providers were not complying with the rules of
the scheme. 
43. On 24 August Mr Tuckett received an e-mail
message which the service centre had sent to all learning
providers saying that from 1 September the system would
not accept bookings in respect of courses where the
booking was made more than 42 days after the start of
the course.  On 26 August Mr Tuckett replied by e-mail
asking the service centre to clarify the position in respect
of learners who submitted an application form at the time
they signed up for a course, and who typically started the
course a week later.  He said that the service centre were
currently taking five to six weeks to process such
applications, and asked whether the requirement to book
learning within 42 days took such delays into account.
[Note: DfES subsequently told my staff that an analysis by
Capita showed that in all cases membership cards were
issued to students and confirmed by the company before
the 42 days deadline for courses to be registered.]
44. On 4 September the service centre issued an 
e-mail message to all learning providers saying that the
service centre were experiencing unprecedented levels of
demand for scheme membership, which had led to a
significant increase in the time being taken to process
applications (paragraph 42).  They said that individuals
would not be disadvantaged as all correctly completed
applications that met the eligibility criteria would have
membership valid from the date on which the service
centre had received the application.  If a learning provider
enrolled a student without a membership card, any
associated discount could not be guaranteed at that stage.
However, if the individual subsequently produced a card
that was valid before the course start date, the learning
provider would then be able to register the learning and
claim the associated discount.
45. Mr Tuckett replied to the service centre to ask if
they could say how long they would take to clear the
current backlog of applications.  He said that the company
had payments totalling £17,220 owing because of the
delay in issuing membership numbers.  He again asked for
clarification of the 42-day rule. [Note: I have found no
record of a reply to Mr Tuckett's message, or to his e-mail
of 26 August - paragraph 43.] On 14 September 
Mr Tuckett wrote to DfES complaining that, of 147
applications for scheme membership submitted by his
learners, only 21 membership numbers had been issued.
As a result, the company was unable to put forward claims
totalling £18,460 for the incentive.  Mr Tuckett said that
the implications for the company's cash-flow and ability to
survive were obvious, and asked that DfES investigate the
matter as a matter of urgency. [Note: I have found no
record of a reply to that letter.]
46. On 18 September officials alerted Ministers that
arrests made by the National Crime Squad that day might
result in media coverage linking the scheme to serious
criminal activity.  They said that an unrelated police
investigation had discovered several accounts in
apparently fictitious names, and further investigations had
discovered several hundred accounts from which it was
suspected that incentives had been improperly claimed by
certain learning providers in order to fund illegal activities.
[Note: DfES have said subsequently that no evidence has
been found to show that scheme funds were used to fund
such illegal activities.] They recommended changes to the
administration of the scheme to prevent some of the most
common forms of abuse.  They said that evaluation
evidence indicated that the great majority of account
holders were satisfied with the scheme.  However,
throughout the summer there had been a steady stream of
press articles concerning abuse of the scheme, together
with a growing body of complaints and evidence from
DfES's own investigations, all of which gave some cause
for concern.  Ministers agreed a number of steps to
address the most pressing problems.  In particular, the
practice was to be ended by which accounts could be
opened by means of blank application forms issued by
DfES to learning providers, and registration of new
learning providers was to be suspended. 
47. On 25 September Mr Tuckett sent the service
centre a list of 145 outstanding applications and asked if
they could confirm the status of a representative sample
of those applications. On 26 September he e-mailed the
service centre to say that his wife had received her
scheme membership number in the post the previous day,
over two months after her application had been submitted
on 21 July.  However, her membership of the scheme had
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been backdated to May.  On 27 September the service
centre replied to say that they had checked a random
sample of seven learners named on the list supplied by 
Mr Tuckett.  Six had live accounts but there was no trace
of the application for the seventh.
48. Also on 27 September the Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State wrote to the then Secretary of State
detailing the abuses of the scheme that had been
identified and setting out the steps that DfES intended to
take to tackle that abuse.  He said that he had instructed
officials to take forward an urgent programme of work to
develop an action plan to identify the scheme's
weaknesses and rebuild the scheme.  He also reported
that there had been an upsurge in demand for the 80 per
cent discount following the ending of the £150 incentive
(paragraphs 39 and 42) and that there was a prospect of
the budget for the scheme being overrun by between £20
million and £90 million.  [Note: on 15 October officials put
the action plan to Ministers.  It recorded that the existing
learning provider guidance was weak and that new
guidance would be issued.  The plan proposed a number of
other initiatives to curb the abuse of the scheme.]
49. On 28 September DfES wrote to all learning
providers saying that, with immediate effect, the service
centre would no longer accept applications to open
accounts unless they had been made personally and
directly by individuals via the scheme's website or by
telephone, and that registration of new learning providers
had been suspended for a period of three months.  DfES
said that, where a non-personalised application was
received after 28 September, the service centre would
write to the applicant informing him or her that the
application was invalid and must be re-submitted by the
individual. [Note: the letter to learning providers did not
explicitly say what would happen to non-personalised
applications received but not processed before 
28 September.]
50. On 30 September Mr Tuckett e-mailed the
service centre to say that he had contacted about half of
his registered learners, of whom 43 had now received
membership numbers, mainly in the previous week.  Many
of those accounts had been backdated to 9 May.  He also
supplied a list of ten learners who had said specifically
that they had not received numbers, yet had applied
between 20 July and 8 September.   On 15 October 
Mr Tuckett sent to the service centre an updated list of 25
learners, all of whom had submitted applications between
18 July and 20 September, who had told him that they had
not received membership numbers.  On 17 October he
sent the service centre a list of 58 learners from whom he
had not yet received details of their membership numbers,
including 28 who said that they had not received their
numbers and a further six whom had experienced
problems with their applications.  All had applied on or
before 20 September. Mr Tuckett asked the service centre
to check the status of the applications and let him know
the outcome. 
51. Meanwhile, on 9 October officials had
recommended to Ministers that the 80 per cent discount
payable under the scheme for certain types of learning
should be ended because of the upsurge in the volume of
claims following the ending of the £150 offer (paragraphs
39 and 42).  They had calculated that the scheme's budget
would otherwise be overspent by between £103 million
and £171 million in the current financial year.  
52. On 17 October DfES's legal adviser received
counsel's opinion as to whether the 80 per cent discount
could be closed down and, if so, what period of notice
might be required by the rules of natural justice.  Counsel
advised that it lay within the Secretary of State's powers
to amend the scheme, subject to an adequate period of
notice. Although there was no definite legal view on what
constituted adequate notice, he felt that four to six weeks
should be sufficient.  The longer period would be easier to
defend and if there were provision for an exception in
special circumstances, that would also reduce the
prospects of a successful challenge.  Counsel added that it
would not be possible for DfES to suspend the whole
scheme without giving at least the same period of notice.
53. Ministers met officials on 18 October and
decided that the scheme should be suspended.  
54. On 19 October the service centre sent 
Mr Tuckett details of 26 students from the list he had sent
on 17 October (paragraph 50).  The service centre's
records showed that nine of those students had live
accounts.  The accounts for four others had been closed.
One record was shown as "serviced" (although no
explanation was given).  [Note: DfES have subsequently
explained that "serviced" referred to an individual
application that had been received and membership
issued.] There was said to be no trace of the remaining 12
applications.  On 23 October Mr Tuckett replied by e-mail
to the service centre.  He said that the 12 applications of
which there was no trace were all paper applications
submitted after 13 September.  As DfES had changed the
rules to preclude such applications with effect from 
28 September, he asked whether the service centre had
simply stopped processing any backlog of paper
applications.  He said that there were up to ten similar
applications outstanding.  He also said that it appeared
that the membership numbers for the eight students for
whom there were said to be live accounts had gone
astray.  One of the students whose account had been
closed had recently received a letter saying that that was
because his membership number had been returned,
marked "recipient unknown at address".  The student had
found that strange as the second letter had been sent to
his correct address, where he had lived for some time.  
Mr Tuckett asked whether there was a problem with the
system which could result in the generation of an incorrect
address.  Finally, Mr Tuckett asked what was meant by
"serviced" and said that the service centre had not
confirmed the account status of a further three students
who had confirmed that they had not received membership
numbers, or of the remaining 23 students on his list.
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[Note: I have seen no record of any reply from the service
centre to that e-mail from Mr Tuckett.]
55. On 24 October the Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State wrote to all Members of Parliament
saying that that he had decided that, with effect from 
7 December, the scheme would cease to operate.  He said
that that was largely because the scheme had exceeded
expectations.  The scheme's rapid growth had caused DfES
to think again how best to target public funds and secure
value for money. He said that he was also concerned that
some people were being pressed to sign up for low value,
poor quality learning, and he had decided to act quickly to
protect the interests of learners and the proper use of
public funds.  DfES intended to write to all existing account
holders between 29 October and 5 November, giving them
at least four weeks' notice of the withdrawal of the
scheme.  The scheme was now closed to new applications
and no new accounts would be opened.  However, learning
undertaken by existing account holders would be
supported as long as it was booked with the service
centre by 7 December.  In a press statement issued the
same day DfES said that the programme had exceeded the
Government's expectations and had expanded beyond its
capacity.  The Government was also concerned by
evidence of exploitation by learning providers offering
poor value for money.  To tackle those concerns, the
Government had decided to suspend the scheme from 
7 December.
56. On 31 October Mr Tuckett wrote to DfES to say
that the suspension of the scheme meant that the
company would probably need to close down by
Christmas.  He had advised all of his learners that they
should attempt to complete their training in the following
eight weeks.  However, even that was dependent on
clarification of the company's obligations under company
law.  He said that the vast majority of his learners had not
had scheme membership numbers when they signed on
for learning, but they had been allowed to start learning
immediately.  Of 215 learners who had signed up, 95 were
still awaiting account numbers, many dating back to
applications lodged in July and August, mainly due to
delays by the service centre.  He asked DfES to confirm
whether they would subsequently challenge the company
for drawing down incentive funds if they were to close at
Christmas, and whether they would be challenged for
booking and confirming existing learners before 
7 December if they were subsequently to close.  
57. On 12 November Mr Tuckett wrote to DfES to
say that 74 of his learners had not yet received their
account numbers. As a result, the company was unable to
claim incentive payments worth over £11,000.  Mr Tuckett
said that the service centre had told him that a large batch
of paper applications lodged in the two weeks before the
discontinuation of paper application forms on 
28 September could not now be traced.  He said that a
further group of 12 learners had apparently had their
numbers issued but had not received them.  Four further
accounts had been closed as the membership packs had
been returned.  Mr Tuckett said that he suspected that
that was because they had been issued with incomplete
addresses.  Mr Tuckett supplied details of all outstanding
applications.  
58. Also on 12 November Mr Tuckett wrote to the
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State saying that, as a
direct consequence of the announcement that the scheme
was to be suspended, the company was expected to close
as insolvent on 31 December, with debts of around
£40,000.  Mr Tuckett said that he had aligned the
company's objectives as closely as possible with
Government policy, yet the Government was pushing the
company under.  He asked for a meeting with the
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.  
59. By Mr A's account, in early November he
received a letter saying that he must use his account
before the scheme closed on 7 December.  On 
13 November he attended a "taster" course at a local
computer training centre (which I call learning provider X)
operated in association with a local college.  The service
centre's records show that, also on 13 November, an
unrelated learning provider (learning provider Y) accessed
Mr A's account through the Internet and registered Mr A
on a European Computer Driving Licence course that had
started on 29 October.  Learning provider Y claimed a
£200 incentive payment in respect of the course, which
cost £250.  On 14 November learning provider Y again
accessed Mr A's account and confirmed his registration.
By Mr A's account, on 20 November he enrolled on a
Computer Literacy and Information Technology (CLAIT)
stage one course with learning provider X, a course
eligible for the 80 per cent discount.  He paid a deposit of
£23, which he expected to be his full contribution to the
cost of the course.  He also gave learning provider X
details of his account, which he had not otherwise used.
Mr A subsequently assured my staff that he had no
knowledge of learning provider Y and had not undertaken
learning with that learning provider.
60. On 16 November DfES replied to Mr Tuckett's
letter of 31 October (paragraph 56).  They said that it had
never been the purpose of the scheme to provide a source
of funding for learning providers, but rather to provide
learning opportunities for individuals and to attract new
learners.  As a direct consequence of that, the scheme
had brought new business to learning providers and UK
Online centres, but there could be no guarantee that the
scheme would keep learning providers supplied or
operating at any given level of activity.  In response to the
specific questions asked by Mr Tuckett, DfES said that
they would not be happy if he drew down funding for
learning that was subsequently not delivered, but that he
should discuss that with an insolvency specialist and with
the Department for Trade and Industry.  They also said
that, if he had applied for funding for people who had
started courses several weeks previously, he had not
followed the rules of the scheme, which were available on
the scheme's website, and was therefore in breach of the
learning provider agreement.  DfES said that learning
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should not be funded in retrospect and enclosed an
extract from the rules of the scheme. 
61. On 20 November Mr Tuckett replied to DfES's
letter of 16 November.  He said that most potential
learners had arrived without a membership number and
had wished to start learning straight away after
submitting an application.  He had been told clearly by the
service centre that the effective date of membership was
the date on which the application form was completed.  He
also said that the service centre had written to say that
members would not be disadvantaged by delays in
processing and that applications would be logged onto the
system based on the date on which they arrived at the
service centre.  Mr Tuckett said that the rules quoted by
DfES simply said that "arrangements" must be made when
the person enrolled and paid for a course.  He had
complied with that, and had made all arrangements in
respect of scheme membership at the time learners
enrolled. He asked for an assurance that membership
numbers would be allocated and all outstanding queries
resolved by the 7 December deadline.
62. On 21 November DfES received a complaint from
a learning provider that he had been offered a large
number of account numbers for sale.  On 22 November
officials from DfES's Special Investigations Unit visited
that learning provider, who gave the investigators a
computer disk containing 1,000 account numbers and
supporting account holder details, which he said had been
given to him as a sample of details of 150,000 accounts
which were being offered to him for sale by a named
person.  [Note: DfES have said subsequently that no
evidence has been found to substantiate that allegation.]
DfES's analysis showed that the sample disk contained
details of live accounts on which incentives could be
claimed.  
63. On 23 November officials reported to the
Secretary of State the evidence supplied by the learning
provider, saying that the security of the account holder
database had been compromised and substantial amounts
of public funding put at risk.  The submission
recommended that the only option to prevent the improper
payment of substantial amounts of public money was to
implement an immediate suspension of the scheme and all
payments to learning providers.  Officials reported that the
Permanent Secretary, as Accounting Officer, had agreed
that the proposed course of action was correct, that the
head of DfES's internal audit had agreed that the response
was proportionate to the evidence of abuse. Advice had
been sought from the Treasury solicitor on the terms in
which the suspension should be framed in order to reduce
the risk of legal challenge. [Note: I have seen no separate
record of that advice or other record of the consultation
with the Permanent Secretary and head of internal audit. ]
Officials said that the Special Investigations Unit would
notify the police of the evidence and allegations held.  On
the same day DfES issued a press notice which said that
the Department had called in the police to investigate
alleged fraud and theft involving the scheme, and that that
afternoon, as a result of irregularities discovered by DfES
investigators, the scheme was shut down immediately,
two weeks earlier than planned. 
64. Also on 23 November, a payment was made to
learning provider Y in respect of the course which they
had registered against Mr A's account.  On 27 November
Mr A attended the first session of his training course with
learning provider X.  The course administrator told him
that they had been unable to claim an incentive against his
account as it had apparently been fully used.  According to
Mr A, he telephoned the service centre that afternoon;
staff told him that, as the computer was inaccessible, they
were unable to access his account details, but that it
appeared that somebody else had used his account
number.  They undertook to check and, if appropriate,
reinstate his account balance.  They asked him to call
again at the end of the week.  [Note:  the service centre
have told my staff that they have no record of Mr A's
telephone call, or his subsequent call (paragraph 68
below); because the system had by then been closed
down, details could not be accessed and notes could not
be updated.]
65. On 27 November the Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State wrote to inform Members of Parliament
that on 23 November DfES had called in the police to
investigate alleged fraud and theft involving the scheme.
Officials had confirmed evidence of serious irregularities
and the scheme had been closed on 23 November.  From
6.30 pm on that day all of the scheme's computer systems,
including the website, the database and the service
centre's systems, had been shut down. The Parliamentary
Under Secretary of State said that DfES intended to
honour all genuine bookings for eligible learning which
were made before the scheme's computer systems were
closed on 23 November, and that officials were putting
into place arrangements to validate outstanding claims
from learning providers.
66. On 28 November the Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State told a previously arranged hearing of
the House of Commons Education and Skills Select
Committee that it had not been possible simply to close
down the small number of learning providers who had
been abusing the scheme.  DfES had attempted to take
steps to investigate such learning providers, but the way
the system operated had not proved strong enough to
allow DfES to close down the operations of learning
providers they suspected had been abusing the scheme.
The Parliamentary Under Secretary of State said that he
was unable to use public money to support the operations
of learning providers who had run into difficulties as a
result of the closure of the scheme.
67. On 29 November the Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State wrote to all registered learning
providers saying that the scheme had been closed from 
23 November because of allegations of fraud and theft.
That decision meant that the scheme was closed to further
booking of learning by account holders and learning
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providers. However, subject to validation, incentives would
be paid in respect of all learning that had been notified to
the service centre before the computer system was
closed.  DfES had also placed on the scheme's website
guidance about the closure of the scheme and DfES's
proposals for dealing with outstanding payments.  
68. On 30 November Mr A contacted the service
centre again.  By his account, a named officer told him
that the scheme had been closed and that his course
would therefore not be funded.  Mr A later told my staff
that he had then reached an agreement with learning
provider X under which he would pay a further £23 to
enable him to undertake his chosen course, although that
did not meet the full price normally charged by learning
provider X for the CLAIT stage one course.
69. Also on 30 November Mr Tuckett met the head
of DfES's Workplace Learning Division.  DfES's record of
that meeting notes that Mr Tuckett explained how the
closure of the scheme had left the company with serious
cash-flow difficulties, which meant that the closure of the
company was by then inevitable.  He said that the
withdrawal of the scheme had destroyed the company's
business plan and its ability to raise additional funding.
He was seeking compensation from the Government for
what he believed to be contractual default, breach of duty
of care, and maladministration.
70. On 6 December Mr Tuckett sent to the service
centre a claim for payments of £8,380 in respect of 55
learners who had registered for his courses and applied
for account numbers.  In most cases the account number
had either not been issued, or had not been received by
the learner before the closure of the scheme.  However, in
four cases the learning had been booked, but not
confirmed, on the system on the afternoon of 
23 November. In one other case the company had been
unable to book learning on the afternoon of 23 November
before the closure of the scheme at 6.30 pm, because, 
Mr Tuckett said, the system was becoming unstable.  
71. 2002 On 15 January, in response to a general
enquiry from my staff about the closure of the scheme,
DfES said that the scheme had been closed without
retrospection on 23 November and that no further learning
could be funded through the scheme.  They said that
investigations were continuing into some 5,120 complaints
in respect of accounts being used without the account-
holder's knowledge. [Note: DfES have subsequently told
the Ombudsman that, as a result of follow-up by their
Compliance and Special Investigations Units, some 20,000
learners have been identified who have indicated that
their accounts were used without their consent.]
House of Commons Education and Skills
Select Committee Inquiry
72. On 16 January the House of Commons Education
and Skills Select Committee announced that they intended
to carry out an inquiry into the scheme.  The terms of
reference of that inquiry were to examine the lessons
learned from the closure of the scheme, with particular
reference to management, policy and plans for replacing
the scheme.  The Select Committee published their report
on 1 May4.  I have studied the report, minutes of evidence,
and memoranda included in the minutes of evidence,
which has greatly assisted my investigations. I draw on
that published material in paragraphs 73 to 77 below.
73. On 23 January the Select Committee examined
officials from DfES responsible for the design of the
scheme and for managing its closure. The officials
acknowledged that one of the reasons for the closure of
the scheme was that the service centre had received an
increasing number of complaints from students who had
tried to use the money in their accounts, but had found
that the money had gone. The officials said that the
scheme had been designed to be simple and non-
bureaucratic in order to build up the demand for learning.
It had also been intended to widen the base of learning
providers rather than to rely on public sector colleges or a
shortlist of established private sector providers.  However,
they acknowledged that that had led to difficulties in that
there had been no quality assurance procedures.  Because
of the way the scheme had been set up, it had been
extremely difficult to stop learning providers who were
determined to exploit the scheme from doing so.  The
scheme had not been robust enough to deliver value for
money or to protect the interests of learners. The scale of
the suspected abuse had increased over the summer of
2001.   As a result of that, DfES had taken steps to tighten
up the rules of the scheme and had introduced the
learning provider agreement, but those steps had not
been sufficient to stop the abuse that was emerging. 
74. Mr Tuckett appeared as a witness at the
Education and Skills Committee's hearing on 23 January.
He said that as a result of the closure of the scheme, the
company had gone bankrupt.  He was concerned that,
although he had signed a learning provider agreement, the
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State had repeatedly
said that there was no contractual agreement between
DfES and learning providers.  He was aware that hundreds
of people had already lost their jobs as a result of the
closure of the scheme.  A particular sector of the training
industry had been "decimated" by the closure of the
scheme.  Concerning the events leading to the closure of
the scheme, he said that the level of security in the
service centre's computer system had been "pitifully low".
He felt that it had been a serious weakness that access to
account details could be obtained simply by entering a ten-
digit number rather than an alpha-numeric combination,
and without cross-referencing to the account-holder's
surname. 
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75. Another learning provider told the Committee
that it had been possible for any registered learning
provider to gain access to Capita's computer system, enter
a reference number, find an unused account and draw
down the funds from that account without any further
checks being made.  
76. On 13 February the Select Committee examined
executives from Capita.  The executives said that Capita
had developed, implemented and operated the computer
systems for the scheme, had administered defined
elements of the scheme's business processes, and had
advised DfES on operational and technical issues.  They
had provided call centre operations for account holders
and learning providers, and a computer processing centre.
On 23 November 2001 DfES had told Capita of a suspected
breach of their computer system.  Capita had co-operated
fully with DfES and the police and had closed down the
service centre immediately at DfES's request.  Capita's
subsequent investigations had not identified any breach of
security or "hacking" of the system, and they had found no
evidence of illegal activity by any Capita employee.  What
they had found was evidence of abuse of the system by a
few registered learning providers.  Throughout the
operation of the scheme, Capita had advised DfES of a
number of issues about actual and potential inappropriate
use of the scheme.  It had been very much an incremental
process as things had come to light and Capita had tried
to work with DfES to introduce changes.  There had been
some major changes in process as the scheme closed.
Capita confirmed that they had been responsible under the
contract for the original design of the registration process
for learning providers, which had then been signed off by
DfES.  However, they were working to a brief agreed by
DfES in terms of the requirements for information from
learning providers.  At the early stages of the design brief
it had been intended that there should be a validation
process for learning providers, but that had not gone
ahead for various reasons, including concerns that it might
discourage new learning providers from entering the
marketplace.  Capita said that, at the time the scheme's
computer system was developed, they were working to a
specification which assumed that the learning provider
would have been accredited previously. The level of
security in the scheme's computer system was built
around that understanding.   Once inside, the scheme was
very open.  Eventually it became apparent that some of
the users were not entirely bona fide and had possibly
abused the scheme.  Capita accepted that when that came
to light they should have either closed the system or taken
action to make it more robust. Access to the details of
individual account holders had been controlled only by
means of their account numbers, which were simply
reference numbers.  Capita found that some registered
learning providers had accessed the system many times
and had extracted names and addresses from the system. 
77. On 26 February the Select Committee re-
examined the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and
senior DfES officials responsible for the operation of the
scheme.  They told the Committee that, before the design
for the scheme had been finalised, DfES had considered
the extent to which the scheme could be integrated with
the learndirect national database of learning
opportunities (paragraph 25), membership of which
involved a registration process requiring some basic
information about learning providers.  DfES had hoped to
be able to provide a direct link between the scheme's
computer system and that of learndirect to provide a
better information service to customers.  The link with
learndirect had been retained in the contract between
DfES and Capita signed in November 2000, but had not
proved possible because of data incompatibility.  However,
it had not been the intention to use the link with
learndirect to provide accreditation for the scheme; it
was not learndirect's function to provide quality
assurance. 
Further developments
78. On 19 April 2002 DfES wrote to a company,
which they believed to be the parent company of learning
provider Y, saying that in January they had appointed a
firm of auditors to undertake factual enquiries about the
operation of the scheme by the parent company and a
number of associated learning providers.  DfES had
considered the information that those bodies had supplied
to the auditors, but were not persuaded that a claim for a
substantial further amount of funding under the scheme
was valid, or that the providers were entitled to payments
of funding from the scheme that had already been made to
them.  DfES gave a number of reasons why they intended
to withhold payment of the claimed funding and possibly
require repayment of incentives already claimed, and
asked the parent company to submit further evidence to
support their claims for incentives under the scheme.
79. On 20 May my staff asked Mr Tuckett to provide
a definitive list of those students for whom he believed
account numbers were outstanding.  On 6 June Mr Tuckett
provided details of 51 learners for whom he had either not
received numbers, or had received them too late for their
learning to be booked onto the system.  [Note:  Mr Tuckett
omitted four of the original 55 learners he had written to
the service centre about on 6 December 2001 (paragraph
70) as DfES had indicated that they intended to honour
payments for learning booked but not confirmed prior to
closure of the scheme.] Mr Tuckett said that the company
had lodged applications for account numbers on the day
that the learners had applied to join.  He could not be
entirely certain that all of the learners listed had not
received their account numbers, but in most cases they
had been extremely helpful and diligent in pursuing the
service centre when the company had asked them to do so
during November 2001.  In many cases learners had
received evasive answers; in some, numbers had been
posted to an incorrect or incomplete address, and there
had been cases where the service centre had admitted
destroying the applications.
80. In response to a request from my staff for
information about those 51 applications, DfES provided an
initial analysis from the service centre's record which
suggested that account numbers had been issued to 20
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learners before the suspension of the scheme. Two
accounts were recorded as closed because letters
addressed to the applicants had been returned to the
service centre.  The service centre said that they had
found no live records in respect of a further nine
applications.  However, they were able to provide copies
of those application forms. In respect of a further 17
applications, all of which were submitted after the use of
blank paper application forms was withdrawn on 
28 September 2001, DfES provided copies of Mr Tuckett's
own form which he used to confirm that the learner had
paid a deposit, but no other information. Mr Tuckett
subsequently confirmed that membership numbers in
respect of eight of those students had been received after
23 November, but that a further nine remained
outstanding.  DfES provided no information about a further
three applicants.
81. On 26 June DfES published their response to the
report of the Education and Skills Select Committee
(paragraph 72).  They said that they had received 5,120
complaints in respect of funding having been removed
from accounts without the account holder's knowledge or
consent.  DfES accepted that it seemed that learning
providers had been able to trawl the computer system to
access account information for which they did not have
authorisation and had subsequently been able to submit
incentive claims.  In response, DfES had closed the
scheme. DfES included as an annex to their response to
the Committee a special review that had been requested
by the Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary to
identify key lessons learned from the development,
introduction and operation of the scheme.  That review,
carried out by DfES internal audit, included among its
findings: 
· All major decisions on the shape and direction of the
scheme were taken with the agreement of
Ministers.  However, it had not been possible to
identify when and how some operational decisions
were arrived at, including the establishment of a
"buyer beware" system with no central checking of
learning provider viability or quality, and the
decision to encourage the widest possible range of
learning providers rather than relying on existing
provision from colleges and work-based providers.
· A significant minority of learning providers had
engaged in aggressive marketing and mis-selling in
order to maximise their income from the scheme,
and many complaints were received in respect of
poor quality provision of learning.
· The project team were under severe time pressure,
which substantially contributed to problems
experienced in developing the scheme.
· No business model was developed to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of available policy
options.
· No decision log was set up to track decisions.
· Although a great deal of management information
was collected by Capita it was not provided for DfES
in a sufficiently helpful format to indicate possible
abuse of the scheme by learning providers.  DfES
may not have reacted quickly enough to some
information received.
· Although a risk register was in place and reviewed
regularly, there was insufficient evidence of active,
ongoing management of each risk by a nominated
team or individual outside the programme board's
meetings.
Commenting on the lessons to be learned for future risk
identification and management procedures, the audit
review said that all policy developments should consider
the risk and implications of fraudulent and improper
activity.   For future contracting and contract management
arrangements there was a need for absolute clarity in
respect of data security requirements in DfES's contracts
and provision should be made for the rigorous testing of
security arrangements.
82. DfES also included in their response to the
Select Committee a synopsis of a detailed report by a firm
of specialist consultants into the security of the computer
systems operated by Capita in respect of the scheme.
That report found that:
· The contract between DfES and Capita was for the
delivery of the scheme, not for the delivery of a
computer system.  The requirements detailed in the
contract made no clear mandates or stipulations
regarding the assessment of security requirements
or ongoing security management.  As a result, no
security policies or procedures specific to the
scheme were developed.
· No requirement was specified with regard to the
determination of security requirements, nor were
existing Government guidelines regarding security
risk analysis followed.
· Security management of the system was
incorporated into Capita's existing security
management functions rather than as a separate
function within the management of the scheme
structure; that had proved to be unsuitable.
· No structured mechanisms and procedures had
been established to identify promptly trends and
patterns of access and usage of the system that
might indicate abuse.
· No procedures had been established to ensure that
the requirements of the security policy were
adhered to.
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· No plans had been established for ongoing testing
of the system to ensure that security provision was
adequate.
· No procedures had been established for the
archiving of relevant log files for later analysis.
The report concluded that no evidence of unauthorised
access to the computer system by external third parties
had been found during the course of the security
investigation.  
Interview with Mr Tuckett
83. Mr Tuckett told my staff that he had established
the company as a non-profit making, community-based
service providing Internet access and basic computer
training.  He had initially looked for funding from various
sources which promoted community ventures, including
the local authority, but those had not proved helpful. In
March 2001 he had seen a leaflet promoting the scheme
and, following enquiries of DfES and the service centre,
had based his future business plan largely on the
incentives for computer training that were payable under
the scheme.  At that time he had expected the scheme to
last for two or three years in its initial form and that any
successor scheme would operate on similar lines. 
Mr Tuckett had recognised that there was a huge unmet
demand for the type of community-based training that the
company could provide.  He had obtained the sponsorship
of a local backer and the company had started operations
in July 2001.   
84. Mr Tuckett said that, in their initial marketing
material, DfES had said that the service centre expected to
issue account numbers within ten working days of receipt
of a completed application form.  However, from the
outset the company had experienced problems with the
registration of learners.  The company had sent learners'
completed application forms to the service centre on a
daily basis.  By the end of July there had been a long list
of learners without account numbers.  He had received no
replies to his complaints about the situation (paragraphs
40 and 45). By the end of September, Mr Tuckett had
established that 24 learners had definitely not received
account numbers; the position in respect of a much larger
group remained uncertain.  The company had continued to
pursue enquiries with learners and the service centre
right up to and beyond the closure of the scheme.  The
administrative effort which all the checking and chasing
entailed for the company had been a significant burden.
85. Mr Tuckett said that from the outset it had not
been entirely clear whether the rules of the scheme had
required that learning providers should wait to receive
learners' account numbers before allowing them to start
learning.  However, the service centre helpdesk had told
him that the relevant starting date was the date the
application form was completed (although the service
centre had subsequently said that the valid date was the
date they received the application form - paragraph 44).
The company had accepted that it carried the risk if forms
were incorrectly completed or students were ineligible for
incentives. 
86. Mr Tuckett said that the key risk to his business
had been the cash-flow problems caused by the service
centre's tardiness and ineptitude in processing
applications for account numbers.  The company's costs in
the early stages were between £7,000 and £8,000 per
month, while income should have been between £6,000
and £9,000 per month. By the end of September 2001 the
backlog in payment entitlement, in respect of learners who
had applied for but not received account numbers, had
risen to over £17,000 (paragraph 45).  That shortfall was
critical and had caused his business sponsors to lose
confidence in the company.  
87. Mr Tuckett said that the service centre had
failed to reply to a number of enquiries about the rules
and operation of the scheme.  In particular, they had not
explained how they would implement the rule requiring
learning providers to register learning within 42 days of
the start of that learning, when account numbers were not
being issued within 42 days.  He had also written to ask
for clarification of the rules on the provision of computer
hardware.  In other instances, even though the service
centre had answered his queries, those answers had been
slow in coming and on occasions evasive.  As to the advice
provided by DfES following the closure of the scheme,
DfES had eventually said that they would pay in respect of
learning booked between 21 and 23 November but not
subsequently confirmed. However, that did not help in
respect of cases where learning could not be booked
because the system had been unavailable for long periods.   
88. Mr Tuckett said that he had not quantified
precisely his and his company's losses.  He had lost his
job, and his own and his sponsor's financial stake.  That
loss was irretrievable as the company could not simply
start trading again if the scheme were resurrected.  The
outstanding incentive payments in respect of 51 learners
who had not received registration numbers were worth
some £8,000.  In addition, the company had wasted effort
and resources dealing with what he found to be a
hopelessly inefficient bureaucracy.  He suspected that,
while fraud and abuse in the form of mis-selling and poor
quality learning had played a part, the real reason for
closure of the scheme was that costs had overrun to an
extent unacceptable to the Government. 
89. Mr Tuckett later told my staff that ten of the 51
learners had either withheld their number from him (one
of whom had completed a substantial proportion of her
course), had withdrawn from the course or had attended
very few training sessions other than the "taster" session
at which they had registered and submitted their
application for scheme membership.  However, the other
outstanding applications had been submitted correctly and
incentive payments were properly due.  He was aware of
difficulties over several of the applications, either because
there were questions over the learners' eligibility for the
scheme or because there were queries over addresses or
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dates of birth.  However, in one case, the service centre
had cancelled an application apparently on the basis of an
incorrect or incomplete address. Mr Tuckett pointed out
that one version of the application form had required only
the first line of the address and the postcode.
90. Mr Tuckett also subsequently told my staff that
he had calculated that by the end of September 2001 the
company was awaiting some £20,000 worth of incentive
payments, whereas had the service centre issued
membership numbers within the ten days he had been led
to expect, that figure would have been closer to £7,000.
That had left the company with a substantial shortfall.  The
company's major sponsor had declined to meet that
additional financing requirement and had effectively
withdrawn all future funding. Mr Tuckett said he was
convinced that had the requirement been for only £5,000,
as would have been the case had membership numbers
been issued on time, the sponsor would not have
withdrawn that funding.  The outcome for Mr Tuckett
personally was that he had not been paid either his salary
of £14,900 from March to December 2001, or a contractual
termination payment of £9,600 that had become due when
the company closed. 
Interview with Capita
91. The Ombudsman's staff interviewed
representatives of Capita about the security measures
that Capita had operated in respect of the scheme and, in
particular, any measures designed to protect the scheme's
computer system.  Capita said that they had designed the
system on the understanding that learning providers
would be required to be registered as learning providers
with learndirect. Capita understood that to mean that
learning providers would have been required to establish
that they were bona fide businesses, with established
premises, insurance cover and bank accounts, and who
could therefore be placed in a position of trust as
members of a closed, accredited community of learning
providers under the scheme. Capita said that DfES had
deferred the requirement for learning providers to be
registered with learndirect very shortly before the
scheme became operational in September 2000, because
that requirement was seen by learning providers as a
barrier to entry.
92. Capita said that access to the computer system
had been protected by means of the requirement for
authorised users to input a valid username and password.
That had been totally successful, and subsequent
investigations had confirmed that there had been no
incidence of unauthorised access to the system.  Once
authorised learning providers had accessed the system,
they had legitimate access to specific functions.  Before
they could access a learner's details they were required to
enter the learner's account number, which was validated
by means of a check digit (although that had not been
intended to be a security measure).  Entry of a valid
number brought up the learner's surname.  However, if an
account had been fully used, the system would not provide
any details but would return an error message.  To obtain
a learner's full details the learning provider had to record
that they wished to book an episode of learning, which
would give access to the learner's name and address and
confirm the maximum amount of incentive funding
available.   
93. Capita said that it had been a requirement of the
contract that learning providers would be required to
access the scheme's computer system by means of the
Internet to certify learning and input claims for incentives.
Capita had been concerned that it would be unusual and
inappropriate for the person who stood to make material
gain to be responsible for inputting the claim on the
computer system.  However, DfES had been clear that that
was how they expected the scheme to operate.   In
retrospect, Capita identified the fact that learning
providers had been allowed to input their own incentive
claims, without any cross check that learning had actually
been provided, as a major weakness in the original design
of the scheme.  
94. Capita said that, other than the username and
password, there had been no additional security measures
built into the system to prevent authorised users from
accessing account details where they did not have the
learner's authority.  They had not considered the
possibility of learning providers using the system being
required to cross-reference the account number with the
account holder's surname, as had been suggested by 
Mr Tuckett in evidence to the Select Committee
(paragraph 74).    The system had been designed on the
basis that authorised users were in a position of trust, in
accordance with the specification and business rules for
the scheme.  DfES had not formally signed off the
computer system, as the contract specified only outputs
and it was for Capita to provide the means to produce
those outputs.  However, DfES had been shown details of
the system before the scheme became operational and
had not raised any concerns over security.  DfES had
subsequently undertaken a preliminary systems audit
(paragraph 33).
95. Capita said that they had always had the facility
to identify inappropriate use of the system.  Had the
scheme not been closed down during November 2001, the
next monthly report would have contained data on misuse
of the scheme that month.  Before that, it had been
possible to identify abuse from trend-analysis of the
weekly payment reports which they sent to DfES, which
had proved to be an effective way of identifying
discrepancies.   However, there had been no specific
requirement under the business rules of the scheme for
Capita to identify high-claiming learning providers.  
96. Capita said that, in respect of the more general
abuse of the scheme, they had raised concerns with DfES
on at least ten occasions.  DfES had taken action in
respect of some of those concerns but not others. Capita
said that it was unfortunate that they had not been
represented on the scheme's programme board, as was
now standard procedure in respect of public-private
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partnerships, and had had no input into DfES's risk
management procedures.
National Audit Office Report
97. On 25 October 2002 the National Audit Office
(NAO) published a report into their investigation of the
scheme5.  NAO examined three issues:
· how far the scheme met the policy objectives; 
· how well DfES managed risks in the design and
implementation of the scheme6;
· how well DfES handled the closure and wind-down
of the scheme.
98. NAO concluded7 that the scheme represented
innovative policy-making which had attracted considerable
new interest in learning, particularly in IT.  However, the
scheme had had to be withdrawn due to a variety of
factors, including:
· pressure to implement the scheme quickly, with
inadequate planning;
· risks in the design and implementation of the
scheme which were not actively managed.  The
value of individual transactions was low and initially
DfES had considered the risk of fraud to be low;
· the relationship between DfES and Capita which did
not operate effectively as a partnership.  Capita
were not involved in the programme board and DfES
left Capita to implement the system.  In adopting a
public-private partnership approach, DfES had
sought to comply with best practice at the time;
· inadequate monitoring by DfES of the information
supplied by Capita and the escalating demand for
accounts.  DfES did not require Capita to carry out
spot checks on the eligibility of learning or basic
validity checks to ensure the bona fides of learning
providers.  
99. NAO said that it was unclear whether Capita had
fully understood the potential for fraud8.  Their bid had
acknowledged the need for rigorous security procedures
to ensure data programmes and documents were secure
from unauthorised access, and to ensure the design of the
system was robust, with minimal chance of fraud or
collusion.  Capita had subsequently told NAO that their
own investigations had revealed no specific evidence of
unauthorised access to the system by external third
parties.  However, a small number of learning providers
had made inappropriate use of the system.  NAO noted
that consultants appointed by DfES to provide expert
advice on policy development, contract development and
programme management had identified in July 2000 the
need to test the robustness of Capita's security
arrangements and proposed learning provider password
security arrangements, but there was no record of DfES
having undertaken those tests or having commissioned
others to do so9.
DfES's response to Mr A's complaint
100. In his initial comments on Mr A's complaint, the
Permanent Secretary said that on 24 October 2001 the
Secretary of State had announced the decision to suspend
the scheme on 7 December due to widespread mis-selling
and potential fraud.  DfES had notified account holders of
that through advertisements in the press and individually
by letter.  Following legal advice, DfES had given six
weeks' notice of the closure of the scheme, to allow
account holders to take advantage of the discounts
available on eligible learning, as long as their chosen
learning provider booked their learning onto the scheme's
system by 7 December.  Mr A appeared to have followed
that advice by enrolling on a CLAIT course on 
20 November.  However, on 23 November, following the
discovery by the Special Investigations Unit of
irregularities, DfES had called in the police to investigate
alleged fraud and theft involving the scheme.  Acting on
police advice, the Secretary of State had decided to close
down the scheme immediately, two weeks earlier than had
been planned.  DfES had then immediately begun making
arrangements to validate outstanding payments.  
101. The Permanent Secretary said that it had been
the responsibility of Mr A's learning provider to ensure
that his learning had been booked with the service centre.
The service centre's records showed that Mr A had
become an account holder on 16 May 2001.  The first
recorded course date was 29 October and a course was
registered and a payment claimed by learning provider Y
on 13 November.  Assuming that the CLAIT course for
which Mr A had enrolled at his local learning centre on 
20 November was his first course, further investigation
would be required to confirm whether the registration of a
course on 13 November by learning provider Y was
deliberate or an administrative error.  Learning provider Y
was associated with another learning provider who was
under close investigation by DfES.  DfES were pursuing 
Mr A's case as part of that enquiry.  
102. The Permanent Secretary said that Mr A
contended that he had booked his course in good faith
after receiving a letter advising him to use his account by
7 December.  While the Permanent Secretary accepted
that DfES had originally intended to make discounts
available until that date, the evidence of serious potential
fraud and theft meant that they had no option but to close
the scheme immediately to safeguard public funds. 
5 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Session 2001-2002, HC 1235
6 NAO Report - page 7, report card 1
7 NAO Report - page 4, overall conclusions
8 NAO Report - pages 24-25, paragraph 2.36
9 NAO Report - page 25, paragraph 2.37
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103. The Permanent Secretary said that DfES had
wanted to make the learning process as simple and
straightforward as possible for the learner.  The design of
the scheme had reflected the policy aim of encouraging
ease of access for individual learners and for learning
providers, in order to make a wide range of opportunities
available under the scheme.  Once problems were
identified, DfES had taken decisive action to tighten up the
operation and rules of the scheme.  A range of measures
designed to secure compliance with DfES's requirements
had been introduced.  
104. The Permanent Secretary recognised the impact
of the decision to close the scheme, but said that it had
always been within the power of the Secretary of State to
withdraw the scheme.  There had not been a contract
between DfES and account holders and DfES did not intend
to consider appeals to make further discounts available.
He did not accept that DfES's refusal to fund Mr A's course
was arbitrary or unreasonable.  
DfES's response to Mr Tuckett's
complaint
105. On 4 March 2002, in his initial comments on 
Mr Tuckett's complaint, the Permanent Secretary said that
although Mr Tuckett had said that there were 95 student
registrations outstanding on 31 October 2001, Capita had
told him that only four unconfirmed course bookings were
currently outstanding in respect of the company.  On 
18 February the service centre had written to learning
providers, including the company, asking them to claim for
any unconfirmed bookings and saying that, subject to
validation checks, if the bookings were confirmed they
would be processed for payment.  However, some of the
95 registrations referred to by Mr Tuckett may not have
been booked with the service centre before the closure of
the scheme.  
106. The Permanent Secretary said that he did not
accept that DfES had failed to respond adequately to
queries about the rules of the scheme during its operation,
or that they had failed to give guidance to learning
providers when the scheme closed.  In addition to
guidance which had been issued to all learning providers
after registration and available on the scheme's website, a
dedicated national helpline was in place to respond to
queries from learning providers.  DfES had also written
regularly to update learning providers of developments.
Over the summer of 2001, DfES had written to learning
providers about the learning provider agreement and
about a number of compliance issues, including on 
15 August a reminder that learning that had commenced
before an individual became an account holder was not
eligible for scheme incentives (paragraph 41).  After 
24 October correspondence had set out the arrangements
that were being put into place to process outstanding
payments.  
107. As to Mr Tuckett's complaint that DfES had given
no contractual notice of the closure of the scheme to
learners or learning providers, the Permanent Secretary
said that DfES had done a good deal to inform both
learning providers and the public at large about the
closure of the scheme and the reasons for it.  On 
24 October 2001 the Secretary of State had announced the
decision to suspend the scheme from 7 December.  Acting
on legal advice, DfES had given a six-weeks' period of
notice, and informed over 8,500 registered learning
providers and 2.6 million account holders individually in
writing.  There was no contractual relationship between
DfES and learning providers or individual learners and no
rule of law requiring DfES to give notice of the intention to
close the scheme, as long as the procedure for doing so
was fair and rational.  DfES had subsequently decided to
close the scheme with immediate effect (on 23 November)
in the light of new and serious allegations of potential
fraud and theft.
108. The Permanent Secretary said that the rapid
growth in the volume of accounts, from 988,539 in May
2001 to some 2,530,000 in October 2001, had meant that
some delays in processing applications had been
inevitable.  However, it seemed that Mr Tuckett had not
followed DfES guidance. He appeared to have started
learners on their courses before asking them to become
scheme members.  DfES had written to all learning
providers on 15 August 2001 to remind them that that
practice was not acceptable.  On 16 November DfES had
written to Mr Tuckett to reiterate that point (paragraph
60).  If the company had failed to comply with the rules of
the scheme, that may have exacerbated Mr Tuckett's
financial difficulties.  If an investigation found that
payments had been made to the company for learning that
had started before students had become account holders,
DfES would seek reimbursement.  
109. The Permanent Secretary added that Ministers
had made it clear that DfES had no plans to offer
compensation.  The extent to which organisations had
made business decisions around their participation in the
scheme was something that each organisation had
determined for itself.  DfES's first duty was to safeguard
public funds and the interests of individual learners.  The
commercial decisions of learning providers and the profits
and losses that flowed from those decisions were matters
entirely for them.
110. In subsequent comments the Permanent
Secretary said that DfES had no record of Capita recording
a concern that it would be unusual and inappropriate for a
person who stood to make material gain to be responsible
for inputting the claim on the computer system (paragraph
93).  The computer system had been designed by Capita
and operated to deliver the outputs specified in the
contract. The Permanent Secretary said he had no
evidence that Capita had considered the key issue of
potential fraud other than in their tender bid, which had
highlighted security issues and had pointed to Capita's
expertise in preventing fraud.  The Permanent Secretary
18 April 2003 • Individual Learning Accounts •
went on to say that DfES did not accept the inference
(paragraph 91) that they would have agreed to any system
which allowed anybody - whether or not "in a position of
trust" - unfettered and unmonitored access to personal
details without the individual's specific signed
authorisation.  Indeed that had been a requirement of the
scheme and of the Data Protection Act 1998.  There had
been a clear and specific contractual obligation on Capita
to meet the requirements of the Data Protection Act,
which had significant implications for the security of
individuals' data.  The statement of requirements for
Capita's service provision included the specification that
each account would have a unique membership number
which must comply with the provisions of the Act.  The
Permanent Secretary said that Capita's system should
have prevented unauthorised access to individuals'
accounts, but he accepted that DfES should have checked
that Capita had in place a secure system to protect
personal data.  Whether or not providers were accredited,
they should have been denied unauthorised access to
accounts and personal details.  Also, access to the
computer system should have been monitored closely to
detect abuse. 
111. The Permanent Secretary said that he did not
accept that the abuse of the scheme that had occurred
could have been identified from the management
information reports supplied by Capita (paragraph 95).
DfES's information was that Capita did not identify "hits"
on the website and did not identify, until the very end of
the scheme, those providers who were searching the
database regularly with the intention of drawing down
money without authorisation.
112. As to representation on the programme board
(paragraphs 22 and 96), the Permanent Secretary pointed
out that in 2000 it was not standard practice for private
sector partners to be members of programme or project
boards. 
Further enquiries about Mr Tuckett's
complaint
113. In February 2003, in a further response to 
Mr Tuckett's complaint of delay and maladministration in
processing applications (paragraph 86), DfES told the
Ombudsman's staff that Capita had assured them that
there was no evidence that mail was delayed at the mail
room dealing with applications.  Capita had said that they
had had rigorous management processes and quality
checks in operation and no contemporary record of
problems of that nature.  The period between the
signature on the application and the date it was received
by the service centre was outside the control of DfES and
Capita.  DfES said that Capita's analysis of processed
applications from 164 of the company's students showed
that the average turnaround time from receipt of the
signed application form to the issue of the membership
card had been 9.5 working days.  All of those learners had
been issued with membership cards within 42 days of
their course start date.  Twenty six learners had
experienced delays during July and August 2001 when
there had been heavy demand on the system before
withdrawal of the £150 offer for the first one million
applicants (paragraph 42).  
114. Capita had undertaken a further analysis of the
51 applications for whom the company said they had not
received account numbers or received them too late to
book learning onto the system before the scheme was
closed down (paragraph 79). Capita's analysis showed that
in 35 of the 51 cases a membership card had been issued
before the closure of the scheme (albeit in one case on
the day of closure).  Two of the applications had been
rejected, one because the date of birth entered by the
applicant was clearly incorrect, the other because the
application form was incomplete.  In six cases there was
no trace of the request for or receipt of the application
form, and in four others the form was recorded as issued
but not returned. In two cases the applicant was already a
member of the scheme.  The remaining two applications,
however, appeared not to have been processed. Capita
maintained that in only ten of the cases was there a
period of over two weeks between the date of signature
and date of receipt and in all of those cases non-
personalised application forms had been used.  For those
ten learners, membership cards were issued between 
23 August and 18 September 2001, so there should have
been no obstacle to the company registering the bookings
before 23 November.  DfES said that, after allowing three
or four days for postal times, six of the applications may
have been delayed by three to four weeks. 
115. DfES told my staff that an action plan had been
agreed with Capita for the withdrawal of non-personalised
forms (paragraph 49).  Only non-personalised forms which
were already being processed at 28 September 2001 were
dealt with.  All unprocessed non-personalised forms,
whatever the date of receipt by the service centre, were
to be replaced by personalised forms.  That involved the
capture of information from the original forms so that
personalised forms could be completed and issued to the
individuals for them to sign and return.  That was a major
logistical exercise requiring the implementation of new
systems and procedures.  Therefore, DfES had agreed
with Capita a complete halt to processing between 
1 October 2001 and 17 October 2001 and then a phased
processing of over 180,000 personalised forms.  That
process was itself halted when the scheme was closed to
new accounts on 24 October 2001.  
116. Mr Tuckett told my staff that in most cases, his
learners joined at "taster" sessions which took place on
Wednesday, Friday and Saturday.  If a prospective student
decided to undertake the company's course he asked them
to complete an application form to open an account, which
he retained and posted to the service centre by first-class
post.  That was usually done at the end of the working
day.  Mr Tuckett was clear that most forms were posted
on the day they were completed.  Occasionally forms
would be posted the next working day, which in the case
of Saturdays meant the following Wednesday.  However,
in no case was the despatch of forms delayed beyond that.
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Mr Tuckett supplied a list showing the dates he believed
all of his applications had been posted.  He said that he
was certain that some of the students to whom DfES said
membership numbers had been issued had not received
them, and that in other cases where the application had
been submitted in good time, the numbers had arrived too
late to be used.  He also questioned the grounds on which
the service centre had refused some applications.
Findings
(a) General findings
117. My investigations into Mr A's and Mr Tuckett's
complaints have been seriously hampered by the poor
quality of records maintained by DfES.  There is no
definitive record of certain key decisions, in particular the
decision not to restrict registration of learning providers
to accredited providers (paragraph 24); the record of
some important discussions was not to be found on the
key files inspected by my staff and was only made
available subsequently; and in some cases it proved
difficult to identify exactly when a decision was taken and
by whom because the status and date of documents was
unclear.  The narrative of events detailed in my
investigation is therefore based on the information that my
staff have seen; and it is inevitable that there are events
and issues where I have been unable to give as thorough
an account as I would have wished.  I note that DfES's
own audit review also commented on the difficulty of
tracking the operational decisions taken (paragraph 81).  I
criticise DfES for those deficiencies. 
118. I find no administrative fault in DfES's decision-
making process first to suspend the scheme from 
7 December, and then to close the scheme on 
23 November, two weeks earlier than they had originally
intended.  The decision to suspend the scheme was taken
as a result of a significant overspend on the scheme's
allocated budget, to which sustained abuse of the scheme
by some learning providers was a contributory factor.
DfES made efforts to curtail that abuse during the summer
of 2001, but those had only limited success.  The decision
to suspend the scheme was taken only after detailed
consideration of the issues and in the light of legal advice
that the Secretary of State was entitled to amend or
withdraw the scheme providing that a satisfactory period
of notice was given. I note that the High Court's ruling on
the application for judicial review against DfES in October
2000 supports that view (paragraph 30).  The decision to
close the scheme immediately on 23 November was taken
in response to clear evidence that a serious breach of the
security of the scheme's computer system had resulted in
the details of a large number of accounts being offered on
open sale.  In those circumstances I do not see that DfES
had any option but to close the scheme.  DfES were
entitled to take both of those decisions at their discretion,
and there is no indication of maladministration in the way
in which they were reached (paragraph 5).  While the
decision to close the scheme completely on 23 November
may give rise to questions about the adequacy of notice,
particularly as notice had already been given of a later
closure, and to questions as to whether there were
contractual or other obligations to learners and learning
providers which may have been breached (DfES do not
accept that there were), those are matters which would
be for the courts rather than for the Ombudsman to
decide.
119. But what of the events leading up to the
suspension and closure of the scheme?  Did administrative
failings by DfES or Capita in the design and operation of
the scheme leave it open to the abuse and fraud that
eventually led to closure of the scheme?  
120. In their evidence to the Select Committee
(paragraph 76), Capita said that the design of the scheme
had been very open and that they had found evidence of
abuse of the computer system by some authorised users
(i.e. learning providers). Capita said by way of explanation
that it had been their understanding, when they designed
the computer system, that they were working to a
specification that assumed that learning providers would
have been accredited previously by learndirect.  The
system had been designed in accordance with DfES's
specification and business rules for the scheme.  DfES told
the Select Committee that they had not intended that prior
accreditation of learning providers would be required.
However, the contract between Capita and DfES
(paragraph 31) contained a clear requirement that
learning providers had to be registered with learndirect
or with one of a number of recognised bodies, and that
Capita should verify that as part of the process of
registration of learning providers. I have also seen
documentary evidence which suggests that, up to the end
of April 1999, officials intended there to be some form of
prior accreditation (paragraph 24). The confusion on such
a fundamental point seems to me to be particularly
unsatisfactory, but I must accept that Capita's
understanding of the original brief was that all learning
providers would have some form of prior accreditation.
Unfortunately, the available papers do not show how
DfES's thinking on accreditation developed between April
1999 and the time when the scheme was launched.  Nor
do they show whether accreditation was envisaged as
being simply a gateway to registration, or a more rigorous
form of quality assurance.  Plainly, the revised intention
not to require accreditation should have been reflected in
the contract by the time it came to be finalised.  Perhaps
more importantly, the revised intention not to require
learning providers to establish that they were bona fide
businesses does not seem to have been reflected in any
amendment to the specification for security of the
computer system, or in any procedure for cross-checking
that appropriate training had been provided to legitimate
account holders before payment was made.
Notwithstanding the understandable desire to keep the
scheme simple with minimal bureaucracy, those were
serious omissions. Whatever requirements there were in
respect of the integrity of users, I would have expected to
see that steps had been taken to ensure that the security
of the computer system was such that users had access
only to data which they were properly authorised to use.  I
consider the failure to take such basic steps, and of DfES
to ensure that they were taken, to be clear evidence of
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maladministration.  That learning providers could access
accounts to which they had no entitlement is a matter of
deep concern which merits my strongest criticism.  
121. I have seen no evidence that DfES brought to
Capita's attention the requirements of the e-Envoy's
framework policy on security requirements for
"information age" Government services (paragraph 14)
before the contract was formally signed in November
2000, or that they gave any further consideration to
whether the scheme's computer system complied with the
requirements of that security framework. That failure
seems to me to be a major administrative fault which
merits my criticism.
122. It is clear that DfES intended from the outset
actively to identify and manage the perceived risks arising
from the scheme.  However, at that stage the main
concern seems to have been possible risks that the
scheme would not deliver Ministers' policy objectives and
targets.  I have seen monthly risk registers from February
2000 onwards (it seems that earlier risk registers were
compiled but are missing from DfES's files). In March
2000, having identified weaknesses in the existing risk
management procedures, officials held a meeting
specifically to address those weaknesses.  But the record
of that meeting does not show that any consideration was
given to the risk of fraud in general or to computer fraud
in particular (paragraph 22).  The first reference to the
risk of fraud by learning providers that I have seen in the
project's risk register was in the June 2000 version
(paragraph 27) when that risk was judged to be low.  The
risk of computer fraud was not identified at that stage.
While DfES could not reasonably be expected to foresee
every possible eventuality in their risk assessments, both
of those areas are the subject of specific guidance in
"Government Accounting" and HM Treasury's booklet
"Managing the Risk of Fraud" (paragraph 12). That
guidance advises departments to evaluate existing
controls and consider whether additional controls are
necessary.  I find it surprising that DfES apparently did not
identify the risks of fraudulent claims and computer fraud
much sooner in the risk register. Be that as it may, it
seems to me that, once DfES had identified the risk of
fraud, it would have been reasonable to expect them to
take further action to evaluate that risk and at least to
attempt to identify whether elements of the design of the
scheme left it open to fraud.  The June 2000 version of the
risk register did propose some counter-measures
(paragraph 27), but it seems to me that those were mainly
reactive, consisting primarily of the establishment of a
monitoring system.  None of the proposed counter-
measures involved consideration of the adequacy of
existing controls; that was suggested only as a
contingency should fraud actually occur.  Furthermore, as
DfES's own evaluation of the scheme confirms (paragraph
81), no specific responsibility was allocated to named
individuals or teams for controlling the risk or the
proposed counter-measures and contingencies.   All of
that is clear evidence of administrative fault and merits my
strong criticism. 
123. It is also clear that abuse of the scheme was
initiated and sustained by unscrupulous learning
providers.  While DfES took retrospective measures to
attempt to curb mis-selling and other abusive practices,
there was a serious failure on the part of DfES at an early
stage either to identify the risk of, or legislate against, a
number of dubious practices.  In particular, they failed to
recognise the implications for payment control of opening
up the scheme to learning providers who were not already
established and recognised as bona fide businesses.  It
therefore seems to me that the decision to suspend the
scheme was forced upon DfES at least partly as a
consequence of their own maladministration.
(b)Findings specific to Mr A's complaint
124. I am satisfied that Mr A acted in good faith in all
respects and complied in full with the requirements of the
scheme, both in order to open an account and to attempt
to obtain a discount on his chosen course.  Mr A had no
knowledge of learning provider Y; and he is clear that he
did not sign up for any learning with that learning
provider, or for any other learning before his enrolment on
the CLAIT course on 20 November 2001.  His description
of subsequent events - that before the closure of the
scheme, learning provider X had attempted to register the
CLAIT course against his account, but had been unable to
do so as the account had been fully used - has been
confirmed by DfES.  Mr A could not have found out about
the misuse of his account unless his learning provider had
attempted to register learning against the account while
the system was still accessible (i.e. before 6.30 pm on 
23 November 2001). That they were unable to register his
learning was through no fault of either learning provider X
or Mr A.   DfES have confirmed that, as the computer
system was closed from 23 November, they are unable to
verify whether Mr A telephoned on 27 and 30 November,
or what staff at the service centre said to him during
those calls (paragraph 64).  However, while a formal
record would have been helpful, I do not see that the
absence of a record in any way weakens Mr A's case. 
125. If Mr A was not at fault, then who was?  Clearly,
primary responsibility lies with learning provider Y, who
would appear to have accessed Mr A's account without his
knowledge or permission, registered non-existent learning
on his part and improperly claimed an incentive payment
from his account.  I welcome the fact that DfES are taking
action against the parent company and are withholding
further payment (paragraph 78).  However, that is unlikely
to be of help to Mr A.  I must therefore also consider
whether administrative fault on the part of either DfES, or
Capita working on behalf of DfES, contributed to Mr A's
loss of the cash incentive under the scheme.
126. The root cause of Mr A's loss of the incentive
payment was that learning provider Y was able to access
his account without permission and withdraw funds from
it.  That may conceivably have been accidental. I believe
that to be extremely unlikely; but even if it was accidental
it would reflect on the poor design of the system. Mr A has
assured my staff that he had never had any contact with
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learning provider Y or given them his account number.  In
order to access his account accidentally and claim against
it, learning provider Y would need to have inadvertently
entered an incorrect number, including a check digit which
gave only a ten per cent chance of the number relating to
a live account, and then to have failed to notice from the
account details that the student details were incorrect.
Learning provider Y would then have had to repeat those
errors while confirming the learning episode.  It seems to
me that a more probable explanation can be found in the
evidence provided to the Education and Skills Select
Committee (paragraph 75), that once logged into the
scheme's computer system it was possible, by continuous
trial and error over a period, for users to identify live
accounts with funds available. It is my view that learning
provider Y must have either obtained details of Mr A's
account in that manner or obtained the details from some
other party who had done so.
127. In my view, Mr A was reasonably entitled to
expect that, if he played his part by abiding by the
requirements of the scheme as applying to account
holders, the data that he supplied to DfES, and his
account, would be secure from unauthorised or improper
access. So what part did Mr A play? After receiving DfES's
letter telling him that his account had to be used before 
7 December 2001, he attended a "taster" course, then
enrolled for a course which was eligible for the 80 per
cent discount.  However, when learning provider X
accessed the system (which obviously must have been
before the system closed on 23 November), they found
that Mr A's account was empty.  I am satisfied that the
administrative failures by DfES and Capita that I have
identified contributed significantly and directly to enabling
the claiming of scheme funds by learning provider Y
through improper use of Mr A's account.  Had the
appropriate safeguards been put in place, either from the
outset or subsequently as a result of actions taken in
response to the identified risk of fraud, it seems to me
that that misuse of Mr A's account could and should have
been prevented; and learning provider X would have
booked Mr A's course when they accessed the system.  If
Mr A's course had been booked - as it should have been -
DfES, in accordance with the commitment given by the
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State on 27 November
(paragraph 65), would have honoured the booking and 
Mr A would not have lost access to an incentive payment
in respect of his CLAIT course, to which he was entitled.
And, having committed himself to the course by enrolment
and payment of a deposit, he would not have been left
with responsibility for the full cost.   As things turned out,
due to the generosity of learning provider X, he had to
bear only an additional £23. While I accept that DfES had
no alternative but to close down the scheme, I find that
maladministration in the design and operation of the
scheme, and the fact that DfES consistently ignored
warnings about potential fraud, were major contributory
factors in putting them into that position. 
128. The Ombudsman's approach where she finds
that maladministration has led to an injustice is to look to
the department concerned as far as possible to put the
aggrieved person into the position he would have been in
but for that maladministration. I therefore invited the
Permanent Secretary to offer suitable redress to Mr A.  In
reply, the Permanent Secretary said that he fully
acknowledged that, had the scheme remained open, 
Mr A's account would have been re-credited (while the
scheme was alive, DfES had re-credited 1,005 people in
similar circumstances).  The Permanent Secretary said
that he would like to extend a sincere apology to Mr A for
the problems he had faced in trying to use his account and
that he proposed to reimburse the £23 so that Mr A was
not out of pocket.  I welcome that decision.  I understand
that DfES are reviewing the circumstances of the other
5,000 or so people who have complained that their
accounts were used without their consent (paragraph 81),
to check whether compensation would be appropriate and
justified in their cases.  I welcome that development.
(c) Findings specific to Mr Tuckett's
complaint
129. I turn first to Mr Tuckett's complaint about poor
administration by the service centre during the currency of
the scheme, and in particular about delays in issuing
students with their scheme registration numbers.  The
Permanent Secretary has suggested that Mr Tuckett
appeared to have acted in breach of the rules of the
scheme by starting students on courses before they had
registered as scheme members (paragraph 108).  It is not
the Ombudsman's role to determine whether any such
breach of the scheme's rules actually occurred.  However,
Mr Tuckett has said that he operated on the basis of
advice, provided by the service centre, that the effective
date of scheme membership was the date the application
was submitted (paragraph 85).  I have been unable to
confirm whether he was given such advice, but I have no
reason to doubt his account and I have seen nothing in
any rules or guidance which would have been available to
Mr Tuckett (before the issue of the revised definition of
eligible learning on 1 August 2001) that contained any
clear stipulation that scheme membership must predate
the course start date.  Neither was there any clear
definition in the rules as to when membership became
effective. DfES's published rules (paragraph 11) stated
only that incentives were not payable retrospectively in
respect of learning where the learner had already paid for
the course, and said that arrangements must be made (by
which I presume DfES meant arrangements to confirm or
apply for scheme membership) at the time the learner
enrolled and paid for the course. In my view, in the
absence of any clear guidance to the contrary, Mr Tuckett
was entitled to believe that a learner's scheme
membership became effective from the date on which the
application form was completed.
130. I consider that DfES, in permitting the issue of
blank membership forms to learning providers, both
expected and consented to the seemingly widespread
practice (by learning providers) of asking students to
submit applications to open accounts at the time they
registered for courses.  I note that in December 2000 over
80 per cent of all application packs issued were issued
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direct to learning providers (paragraph 34).  While on 
15 August 2001 DfES wrote to all learning providers to say
that learning must not commence before scheme
membership (paragraph 41), they still did not clarify the
effective date on which scheme membership started. I am
satisfied that Mr Tuckett would have had no reason to
believe, on reading that letter, that he was acting in
breach of the rules of the scheme.  Furthermore, on 
4 September the service centre e-mailed all learning
providers to say that, due to delays in processing
applications for membership, all applications would be
backdated to the date of receipt by the centre, and that
discounts would be payable in respect of students enrolled
without membership cards if a card was subsequently
produced (paragraph 44).  On that basis, it seems to me
that it would be quite wrong for DfES to single out 
Mr Tuckett for following a practice that he reasonably
believed was within the rules of the scheme, that was by
all accounts widespread and which the service centre had
clearly condoned even after DfES had sought to bring it to
an end.    
131. Mr Tuckett has said that there were lengthy
delays by the service centre in processing his learners'
applications for membership. My comparison of 
Mr Tuckett's records with the list of 164 applications
which Capita said that they had processed (paragraph
114) suggests that in respect of 54 cases (over half the
applications submitted in July and August 2001) there was
a delay of two weeks or more between Mr Tuckett posting
an application form and the form being recorded as
received by Capita.  The longest such delay was 53 days,
between 14 July and 5 September.   I have no reason to
doubt that the company posted the applications on or
shortly after the dates that Mr Tuckett's records show. Of
the 164 processed applications, 49 are recorded as having
been received by Capita on 5 September 2001, many of
which the company posted in July or early August.
Despite Capita's reassurance (paragraph 114), on the
balance of probabilities it seems to me likely that the
service centre delayed recording the receipt of some
applications.  
132. I accept that not all of the 51 learners for whom
membership numbers were outstanding (paragraph 79)
would have subsequently gone on to pursue their courses
with the company; Mr Tuckett has himself identified ten
such learners, for whom incentive payments would
probably not have been appropriate (paragraph 89). That
leaves some 41 learners whom Mr Tuckett has said either
did not receive membership numbers, or received them
too late for him to register learning before the premature
closure of the scheme. It seems that, in respect of some
of those applications, the target of processing the
applications within ten days was not met.   However, I am
unable to reconcile in all cases Mr Tuckett's detailed
account of his experiences on individual applications with
the service centre's records of those applications
(paragraph 113). Capita have said that membership
numbers for 35 of the 51 learners were issued before the
closure of the scheme (paragraph 114), although 
Mr Tuckett is clear that several of those were not received
by the applicants.  In his correspondence with the service
centre Mr Tuckett raised the possibility that the system
was producing incorrect addresses. He also asked
whether the backlog of paper applications had been
accounted for and processed (paragraph 54). It seems
that the service centre did not receive some of the
applications.  Also, some of the applications were the
subject of unresolved queries about the learners' eligibility
or personal details. In two cases the evidence suggests
that the incentive payment may have been drawn down by
another learning provider or providers without the
applicant students' knowledge or consent. [Note: DfES
have subsequently told my staff that one of those students
has confirmed that she did undertake learning with
another learning provider.] However, I have seen no
record of any reply to the points Mr Tuckett raised.
133. Although many applications were eventually
processed, enabling the company to claim the appropriate
incentive payments, Mr Tuckett has said that the delay had
a serious impact on the company's cash-flow, which
ultimately was a factor in the withdrawal of support by the
major sponsor (paragraph 86).  I have no basis to
challenge his assertion. In several instances the service
centre's records show receipt of an application signed only
after the withdrawal of non-personalised application forms
on 28 September 2001, whereas the company's records
show an earlier application submitted before that date.
On 4 September the service centre acknowledged that
there had been significant problems in processing
membership applications (paragraph 44). Mr Tuckett has
shown that he pursued the service centre regularly and
tenaciously, from the end of July onwards, in respect of all
outstanding membership numbers, and that he pursued
his learners in the same manner. I find the service
centre's response to Mr Tuckett's enquiries to have been
less than satisfactory and I criticise them for that.  As late
as 12 November 2001 (paragraph 57), Mr Tuckett supplied
DfES with a list of outstanding queries.  Notwithstanding
the suspension of the scheme, I consider that DfES had a
continuing responsibility to deal with those enquiries,
either by arranging the reissue of membership numbers
which had not been received, or where applications had
not been received by the service centre, advising 
Mr Tuckett that that was the case.  I have seen no
evidence that DfES took any such action; that also merits
my criticism.  
134. In at least two cases the service centre's
analysis shows that the applications were received but
were not processed.  Both of those applications were
made on non-personalised forms before 28 September
2001.  While DfES confirmed to learning providers that for
any non-personalised applications received on or after
that date, the applicant would be asked to re-submit the
application, I find that it was not made clear to learning
providers what would happen to non-personalised
applications received but not processed before 
28 September (paragraph 49).  That was a serious
omission.  Processing of all applications was suspended
between 1 and 17 October, then re-started (when 180,000
personalised applications were outstanding for
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processing), then halted again on 24 October (paragraph
115).  It seems likely that that was the reason why the
two applications were never processed.  While it was not
unreasonable to close the scheme to new applications
from 24 October (paragraph 55), I find it most
unsatisfactory that applications that had been properly
made, on the appropriate forms, before 28 September,
were left unprocessed. 
135. Has any of the maladministration that I have
identified resulted in an injustice to Mr Tuckett and the
company and if so what redress would be appropriate? In
putting his complaint through the Member, Mr Tuckett
suggested that there should be: 
· A national compensation scheme to cover the full
loss of revenue and associated losses suffered by
learning providers for the period between the
announcement of the suspension of the scheme on
24 October 2001 and the full implementation of a
replacement scheme, to cover those providers who
made commitments in reliance on the Government's
announcements and who implemented training
provision which followed the letter and spirit of the
scheme.
· Full payment to learning providers who would have
expected to make bookings of learners onto the
system before 7 December but were prevented from
doing so by the closure on 23 November.
· Full payment to learning providers for learners who
applied for account numbers and signed enrolment
statements before 24 October, but whose account
numbers were not issued by the service centre in
sufficient time to enable them to be booked on to
the system by 23 November.  
136. It seems to me that it was the suspension of the
scheme, rather than its eventual closure, that brought
about the failure of Mr Tuckett's company. Immediately
the suspension was announced, Mr Tuckett wrote to DfES
to say that the removal of the company's main source of
income would inevitably result in its closure (paragraph
56) and on 12 November, still two weeks before the
closure of the scheme was announced, he wrote to the
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State to say that the
company was expected to close as a result of insolvency
on 31 December (paragraph 58). While I have found that
maladministration in the design and operation of the
scheme was a contributory factor in causing Ministers to
decide to suspend the scheme (paragraph 123), I have not
found that that was the sole cause (paragraph 118).  I am
therefore unable to attribute the eventual failure of the
company wholly and directly to maladministration by DfES. 
137. Did Mr Tuckett have a more general expectation,
as a result of the company's involvement in the scheme,
that incentives from the scheme would continue to be
paid, if not in perpetuity, then for the foreseeable future?
DfES have said that the extent to which learning providers
relied on the scheme was a business decision which
learning providers had decided for themselves.  I fully
accept that.  That said, I do not believe that DfES can
simply disregard the effect of the provision of a significant
subsidy towards the cost of a substantial share of the
market for adult learning.   It seems to me that existing
learning providers, particularly in the basic IT sector,
effectively had little choice.  Had a learning provider
decided not to register under the scheme he would have
been unable to obtain the discounts available; as a result
he would have been at a significant competitive
disadvantage in relation to other providers who had
decided to participate and were as a result able to offer a
reduction of up to £200 in course prices for certain
courses. 
138. However, Mr Tuckett's company did not exist
when the scheme first came into operation in September
2000.  By his own account, Mr Tuckett considered several
other business models before deciding to base his
business plan on the incentive payments that he expected
to obtain from the scheme - i.e. he had in effect chosen to
make the company dependent on payments from the
scheme.  Mr Tuckett believed that that was a stable
source of income, as DfES had indicated that the scheme
was expected to continue for several years, and the
scheme seemed to reflect the Government's apparent
recognition of the importance of computer literacy to the
country's economic well-being. I do not doubt that DfES
did expect the scheme to continue for a number of years.
Clearly, Mr Tuckett would not have based his business on
the scheme had he been aware while formulating his
business plan that the scheme was likely to be closed.
However, when he started trading in July 2001 the extent
of the budgetary overspend was unknown and the
difficulties in respect of fraud and mis-selling had only
recently come to DfES's attention.   I am satisfied that up
to mid-October 2001, DfES were fully committed to
continuing the scheme.  I have seen no evidence that they
deliberately withheld information that may have caused 
Mr Tuckett to revise his business plan.  While it was most
unfortunate that the scheme had to be withdrawn only a
few months after the company started trading, it was
always open to the Government to change its policy
objectives as circumstances changed.  I do not therefore
find that there are grounds for pressing DfES to consider
offering compensation for the full loss sustained by the
company from 24 October 2001 as suggested by 
Mr Tuckett.
139. As to the bringing forward of the closure of the
scheme from the planned date of 7 December to 
23 November 2001, as I have noted above (paragraph
118), I do not see that DfES had any choice but to take
that decision when they did, and I believe that the fate of
the company had already been sealed by the earlier
decision to suspend the scheme (paragraph 136).  I do not
therefore see a basis for pressing DfES to offer
compensation for the loss of income from accounts that
would otherwise have been opened in the period 
23 November to 7 December 2001.
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140. The scheme was primarily intended to benefit
learners, not learning providers. It could be argued that
any delay or failure in issuing account numbers would
primarily disadvantage learners; and if learning providers
allowed students to start learning before they were able
to produce an account number that was at the provider's
risk.  I can see some force in that argument.  However, on
4 September 2001 the service centre wrote specifically to
learning providers to say that accounts would be
backdated to the date the service centre received the
application form (paragraph 44).  It seems to me that, in
doing so, the service centre acknowledged that learning
providers had a legitimate business interest in the
outcome of learners' applications to open accounts.  Up to
the end of September the vast majority of membership
forms were sent to learning providers to issue to
prospective learners.  Furthermore, I have seen a number
of publications and statements by DfES in which they refer
to learning providers as "partners" or otherwise
acknowledge the role of learning providers in attracting
new learners (see, for example, paragraphs 15 and 39). It
seems to me therefore that Mr Tuckett could reasonably
have expected that, if the company took steps to help
learners apply for membership of the scheme (before its
closure), and those learners subsequently undertook
learning with the company, the service centre would issue
to those learners the details that the company needed in
order to be able to claim the incentive payments for
provision of that learning, and that they would do so
without undue delay.  Any delay or failure to issue those
account numbers would inevitably have financial
implications for the company.  I therefore asked the
Permanent Secretary if DfES would offer a compensatory
payment to Mr Tuckett in respect of any learners whom he
could satisfactorily demonstrate had applied for
membership of the scheme before 24 October 2001, were
committed to use the discount to purchase training with
the company and who, because of the moratorium on
processing non-personalised forms or other shortcomings
by the service centre, had not been issued with account
numbers by the time the system was closed down at 6.30
pm on 23 November 2001.  I also asked the Permanent
Secretary if DfES would offer Mr Tuckett a consolatory
payment for the extensive delays the company
experienced in the processing of applications, with the
consequent impact on the company's cash flow, and the
inconvenience and expense caused to the company in
expending so much time and effort in pressing the service
centre to issue account numbers and respond to queries.  
Capita's comments on the Ombudsman's
findings
141. Capita's Director of Policy and Public Affairs (the
Director) said that he regretted the difficulties
experienced by Mr Tuckett in respect of a small number of
learners.  However, in respect of all 164 of his learners'
applications processed by Capita, records showed that
membership cards had been issued in time, subject to the
students giving the company their account numbers, for
Mr Tuckett to book learning. The Director said that there
remained some differences of interpretation between
Capita and DfES. In particular, Capita's view was that
Capita's responsibilities under the Data Protection Act
(paragraph 13) were those of a Data Processor and that
DfES's role was that of Data Controller.  Capita were also
clear that the scheme's computer system conformed to the
requirements of the business rules of the scheme.  There
was no evidence of any external breach of the system or
access by any unauthorised user.  In respect of the
Ombudsman's findings concerning delay in recording
receipt of mail (paragraph 131), the Director said that
under normal operating conditions Capita processed all
mail on the day of receipt. It was their view that the
available evidence did not support the conclusion that
there had been delays in recording the receipt of
applications. They received 376 complaints in respect of
such delay between August and November 2001, which
represented just 0.18 per cent of the applications
processed.  [Note: I have reconsidered my findings in the
light of the Director's representations but am satisfied that
the evidence supports the findings on the balance of
probabilities.] Capita said that, as had been
acknowledged by NAO (paragraph 98), the relationship
between DfES and Capita had not operated effectively.
Capita's exclusion from the scheme's project board had
restricted their ability to influence DfES's decision-making.
[Note:  in their evidence to NAO and the Ombudsman,
DfES said that they had sought to follow best practice
operating at that time.] As a consequence, they believed
that policy changes by DfES led to operational difficulties
which, in addition to the unexpected popularity of the
scheme, had created delays in the processing of some
applications. The Director accepted that both Capita and
DfES had much to learn from the successes and the
failures of the scheme. 
The Permanent Secretary's response to
the findings
142. The Permanent Secretary said that he was very
sorry for the difficulties that Mr Tuckett had experienced
in his involvement with the scheme in respect of a small
number of learners during 2001.  The delivery of the
scheme had fallen a long way short of the standards that
the public was entitled to expect and the Permanent
Secretary was determined to ensure that lessons were
learned and that there was no repeat of the failings
identified by my investigation.  The Permanent Secretary
said that DfES would be apologising to Mr Tuckett, and
that he had decided to offer reimbursement for those
learners to whom Mr Tuckett could show that account
numbers had not been issued due to the moratorium in
processing non-personalised forms (paragraph 115) or
other delays in processing and had been committed to
purchase learning from the company.  The Permanent
Secretary also intended to offer Mr Tuckett an ex gratia
payment of £500 in recognition of the inconvenience and
expense his company had incurred as a result of the
delays in issuing account numbers. DfES officials would
contact Mr Tuckett shortly to make suitable arrangements.  
143. In the light my findings the Permanent Secretary
said that he had decided to offer appropriate
reimbursement, but not a consolatory payment, to other
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learning providers who may have experienced similar
difficulties, subject to the provision and validation of
satisfactory evidence.  As a priority DfES intended to write
before Easter to some 200 learning providers who had
complained directly to DfES, Capita or the Ombudsman in
terms similar to Mr Tuckett.  Although DfES did not expect
that other learning providers would be affected, in June
they intended to contact some 3,200 other learning
providers who had been active in the period following the
suspension of the scheme on 24 October 2001.  The
intention is to pay the full incentive that would have been
payable had the full booking and confirmation of learning
been completed by 23 November 2001 for individuals who
would have otherwise become account holders and were
committed to learning with the provider in question. DfES
did not intend to invite claims from learning providers who
were the subject of enquiries by the Police or by DfES's
own compliance unit.  However, where appropriate, such
providers would be asked to claim at a later date.  
144. The Permanent Secretary said that there had
been very few cases of delay, for whatever reason, in the
context of a very successful programme which had
resulted in some 2.6 million learning accounts being
opened.  However, DfES recognised that, for both learning
providers and potential learners affected, those delays
would have caused difficulties.  The problems had
happened at a time of demand for scheme membership
which had exceeded both expectations and processing
capacity.  Changes in the scheme's operation, including the
need to end the acceptance of non-personalised forms and
the necessary decision to suspend the programme to
prevent abuse and safeguard public funds, had led to
additional pressures on the service centre.  Those had
exacerbated by the earlier than expected exhaustion of
the initial grant of £150 to the first one million account-
users.  He acknowledged that DfES had much to learn
from the scheme's successes and mistakes and said that a
programme was underway within DfES to ensure that
those lessons were learned.
Conclusions
145. There was serious maladministration by DfES in
setting up and managing the scheme, and a failure by DfES
and Capita to work effectively together to make sure that
there were adequate safeguards built into the scheme and
computer system to prevent improper access to accounts
once the requirement for prior accreditation had been
dropped.  
146. That failure enabled improper access to Mr A's
account and the loss to him of the opportunity to obtain
the incentive payment to which he was entitled under the
scheme.  The closure of the scheme between the time
when Mr A enrolled for his chosen course and the date, a
week later, of his first attendance, effectively precluded
him from arranging to have his account restored.  I
consider that the Permanent Secretary's apology together
with the offer to reimburse Mr A for the additional course
costs he incurred, and DfES's proposal to identify whether
there are others in a similar position, is a satisfactory
response to a justified complaint.  
147. That maladministration contributed to, but was
not wholly responsible for, the need to suspend the
scheme.  The success of the scheme was far greater than
expected in terms of the number of new learners
attracted, leading to a significant cost overrun which
Ministers judged to be unsustainable.  The decisions to
suspend and then immediately close the scheme were
policy decisions which Ministers were entitled to take and
I have not found evidence of maladministration in the way
that they were reached.  
148. While Mr Tuckett had a reasonable expectation
when the company first joined the scheme in July 2001
that DfES would continue to operate the scheme and make
incentive payments for some time to come, there was no
firm commitment to do so for a specified period.  I have
found that there was maladministration by the service
centre in processing applications to open accounts from
learners who had registered for training with Mr Tuckett's
company.  That maladministration took the form of
extensive delays, which I have no doubt impacted on the
cash flow of the company at a period critical to its
development, and of the failure in some cases to issue
membership numbers or to respond adequately to queries
about missing numbers. That meant that the company was
unable to obtain incentive payments in respect of a
number of learners who had registered for its courses.
The Permanent Secretary has said that DfES intend to
apologise to Mr Tuckett and to reimburse him in respect of
learners who, as a result of maladministration, did not
receive membership details before the closure of the
scheme.  He also offered Mr Tuckett an ex gratia payment
of £500.  I welcome that offer, and also the Permanent
Secretary's undertaking that DfES will seek to reimburse
other learning providers who experienced problems
similar to Mr Tuckett.  I regard all of that as a satisfactory
outcome to a justified complaint.  
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